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REFRAMING HOUSING: INCORPORATING 
PUBLIC LAW PRINCIPLES INTO PRIVATE LAW 
KRISTEN BARNES* 
A new public-private law paradigm is developing with respect to the 
relationship of the state to private contracts. The paradigm melds private 
law concepts like unconscionability, good faith, and fair dealing with the 
public human rights principles of dignity and vulnerability. I trace this 
paradigm shift in the context of the housing law of Spain, where several rich 
cultural and legal resources have inspired a new sensibility with regard to 
residential mortgage loan contracts, rental agreements, and the overall 
duties and obligations of governments to address the citizenry’s housing 
needs. Although this reorientation reflects decisions from the European 
Court of Justice and from the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, it is equally driven by an organic transformation 
in our understanding of housing markets and redistributive justice. Rather 
than receive the new paradigm with myopic trepidation, observers should 
herald it as the beginning of a much-needed dialogue between the public, 
human rights discourse, private business interests, and economic markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In some quarters, human shelter is a market good. Access to housing is 
determined by contract law and thus allocated on the basis of ability to pay 
and individual preferences. As a market good, access to housing is often 
limited by such terms as fraud, duress, unconscionability, good faith, and fair 
dealing. In other quarters, human shelter is considered a basic foundation of 
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human flourishing and capacity and thus comparable to a right. The market 
view and the human rights view seem to inhabit two different realms, 
maintained by scholars who typically do not dialogue with each other. One 
view inhabits the world of private law; the other the realm of distributive 
justice.1 Markets allocate housing on the basis of contract; shelter is provided 
to the most vulnerable by the state. 
In this article, I challenge the dichotomy between markets and rights 
and suggest a new synthesis in both language and practice to delineate a 
model that is both market and rights-oriented.2 I accomplish this through a 
case study of the evolution of approaches to housing markets in Spain. In 
particular, a confluence of forces has begun to reshape the public regulation 
of private financing and other private order agreements. Although the 
process has by no means resulted in a complete integration of private and 
public law, it has produced a repositioning on how Spanish courts evaluate 
housing contracts and the actions they may take with regard to unfair 
contracts. Some of the forces are the widespread disillusionment regarding 
financial housing instruments following the global economic crisis of 2008, 
the disastrous impact of the terms of existing financial instruments, 
widespread domestic protests prompted by human suffering, and the external 
forces of the European Union (EU) and international social impacts. The 
result is a reorientation toward consumer protection in housing that 
integrates concepts of unconscionability, good faith, vulnerability, and 
human dignity into the previously private regulation of housing contracts. 
I draw several major lessons from my analysis. First, the development 
of national policy in a country like Spain results from an iterative process 
that reflects the relationship between international human rights law, private 
ordering in the central sector of housing, and EU law. Second, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ)3 and the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) have been instrumental in 
reshaping how private housing contracts are treated and in articulating a 
 
 1.  See Alain Supiot, The Public-Private Relation in the Context of Today’s Refeudalization, 11 
INT’L J.  CONST. L. 129, 129 (2013) (noting the historical distinction between public and private law). 
Supiot maintains that it is the “subordination of private to public” that “makes the structure of law 
intelligible and dependable.” Id. at 130; see also Hugh Collins, Private Law, Fundamental Rights, and 
the Rule of Law, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2018). 
 2.  Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the 
Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125 (2013). 
 3.  Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). The ECJ is the Court of 
Justice for the European Union. Id. Based in Luxembourg, the ECJ “interprets EU law to make sure it is 
applied in the same way in all EU countries and settles legal disputes between national governments and 
EU institutions.” Id. 
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baseline of procedural fairness due to contractual parties.4 Furthermore, they 
have influenced the development of a new approach in borrowing, 
consolidating, and interpreting concepts across theoretical frames of public 
and private law.5 Third, governments within the EU and ESCR treaty orbit 
bear significant responsibilities. They must ensure that individuals are 
accorded meaningful due process in hearings concerning owned and rented 
housing and provide services or resources where the market fails to do so. 
Fourth, human rights obligations, as interpreted by the ESCR Committee, 
compel governments to satisfy substantive housing needs even when 
resources are constrained. 
This article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the project. Part II 
then examines the centrality of housing in the global economy, the origins of 
Spain’s housing crisis, and policies that heavily favored banks, to the 
detriment of precarious property owners6 and non-owners. Part III provides 
a background on the protests that arose in the midst of Spain’s economic 
recession and their contribution to the paradigm shift. Part IV summarizes 
germane international and national legal mechanisms that impact the housing 
sector and related legal claims. Part V examines rulings of the ECJ and the 
ESCR Committee to elucidate how consumer protection applies to mortgage 
loan borrowers and renters. I also highlight moments of inter-juridical 
dialogue, which have contributed to reframing housing transactions, along 
with Spain’s legislative responses. Part VI addresses critiques of private and 
public law scholars and interrogates the concepts of unconscionability, good 
faith, fairness, vulnerability, and human dignity. Part VII discusses 
progressive changes in housing laws and rules that are beneficial to 
consumers. Part VIII includes recommendations for constructing equitable 
and stable housing markets. Part IX concludes the Article. 
 
 4.  Admittedly, procedural and substantive fairness are distinct. Nonetheless, procedural fairness 
can be a pathway to achieving substantive fairness. 
 5.  The ECJ and the ESCR Committee have different competencies. The ECJ is charged with 
interpreting EU law, including the directives and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
The ESCR Committee is authorized to interpret the ESCR treaty. 
 6.  Here, I am drawing upon the concept of the precariat, popularized by Guy Standing. See 
generally GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2016). The “precariat” refers 
to “[p]eople whose employment and income are insecure, especially when considered as a class.” 
Precariat, LEXICO, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/precariat. I am using the term to refer to 
individuals who hold the title as the owners of mortgaged real property but whose circumstances with 
respect to their lenders, debt load, and, perhaps, fragile employment status, mean that they are in imminent 
danger of losing their property through default and foreclosure. 
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II. THE HOUSE THAT SPAIN BUILT: FINANCIALIZATION, 
REPOSSESSIONS, EVICTIONS, AND GHOST TOWNS 
Spain, like other democracies, remains challenged by matters of 
housing insecurity and over-indebtedness. To understand the evolving 
approach towards housing contracts in private law and public law, it is 
necessary to examine the conditions that precipitated Spain’s housing crisis. 
Economic devastation remains imprinted on the country’s landscape, despite 
economic forecasts of growth and declarations that the nation’s descent into 
financial austerity is at an end.7 Unfinished business remains.  Therefore, it 
is necessary to analyze the housing sector, a primary vehicle through which 
the destruction unfolded. 
On January 1, 1986, the EU welcomed Spain into the fold.8 Prior to its 
acceptance, Spain’s pre-1986 policies laid the foundation for the economic 
crisis that emerged in 2008. General Francisco Franco9 anointed housing as 
a strategy for national economic development and prosperity in the latter 
years of his reign.10 Under Franco’s regime, the nation transformed from a 
country of renters into one fixated on homeowners,11 creating approximately 
thirty-five million new consumers.12 Privileging homeownership over 
affordable rental housing continued as a standard government practice even 
 
 7.  Peter S. Goodman, Spain’s Long Economic Nightmare is Finally Over, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/business/spain-europe-economy-recovery-unemployment 
.html. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides the following economic 
forecast summary: 
After expanding at over 3% in the past three years, the economy is projected to grow 
at a robust, but more moderate, pace in 2018 and 2019. Favourable financial conditions 
and strong job creation will continue to support private domestic demand. Net exports will 
also contribute positively to GDP growth. Inflation will remain moderate as unemployment 
remains high. 
103 OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 221 (2018). 
 8.  Spain, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ 
spain_en  (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). 
 9.  General Francisco Franco was a dictator who ruled Spain from 1939–1975. STANLEY G. PAYNE 
& JESÚS PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014). 
 10.  José María Cardesín, City, Housing and Welfare in Spain, from the Civil War to Present Times, 
43 URB. HIST. 285, 288 (2016) (noting that this period is defined as “desarrollismo” or “policy of 
development at all costs”). 
 11.  See Dan Galluppi, Country Case Studies and Links: Spain, EUR. WELFARE ST., 
https://www.pitt.edu/~heinisch/ca_spai.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2020); Melissa García-Lamarca, 
Reconfiguring the Public Through Housing Rights Struggles in Spain, in CITY UNSILENCED: URBAN 
RESISTANCE AND PUBLIC SPACE IN THE AGE OF SHRINKING DEMOCRACY 45 (Jeffrey Hou & Sabine 
Knierbein eds., 2017) (explaining that mfore than fifty percent of Spain’s inhabitants were renters in 
1950). 
 12.  Eric Solsten & Sandra W. Meditz, Spain: A Country Study—Population, COUNTRY STUD., 
http://countrystudies.us/spain/34.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (referring to 1975 figures). 
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after the transition to parliamentary democracy.13 In the period covering 
1950 to 2001, “the percentage of privately owned main homes rose from 46.7 
percent to 88 percent whilst the number of rented homes fell from 3.2 million 
to 1.6 million.”14 Rather than creating an economy in which all residents 
shared in the country’s wealth, this narrow growth policy, combined with 
archaic mortgage laws and global economic pressures, ploughed the way for 
financial disaster.15 Advancing into the twenty-first century, financialization 
proved to be an attractive approach for Spain.16 Financialization refers to a 
conceptualization of a system in terms of profiteering and revenue.  It 
privileges shortsighted wealth accumulation. Typically, only those select 
few who are in dominant economic or political positions reap the benefits. 
Rather than alleviating inequality, financialization deepens it.17 Unsound 
lending practices in Spain flourished under the financialization ethic.18 The 
 
 13.  See Spain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/spain 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2020). 
 14.  Cardesín, supra note 10, at 300. For additional information on changes in homeownership rates, 
see JUDITH SUNDERLAND, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED DREAMS: IMPACT OF SPAIN’S HOUSING 
CRISIS ON VULNERABLE GROUPS 5 (2014). 
 15.  Cardesín, supra note 10, 300–04. 
 16.  See generally MANUEL B. AALBERS, THE FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING (2017) (providing 
an extensive discussion on financialization). 
 17.  Mike Collins, Wall Street and the Financialization of the Economy, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2015, 
11:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-and-the-financialization-
of-the-economy/#31224d3f5783; Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters 
(Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College, Working Paper No. 525, 2007), http://www.levyinstitute.org/ 
pubs/wp_525.pdf. Commenting on Rana Foroohar’s book, MAKERS AND TAKERS, the Wharton School 
of Business writes: 
Where finance and banking were once the servants of the larger economy, pooling deposits and 
directing them to productive investment, they have now become the master. The 
‘financialization’ of banking, and of business in general, has hampered real growth and 
innovation while exacerbating inequality. 
The Pitfalls of the ‘Financialization’ of American Business, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON: FINANCE (June 
28, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/pitfalls-financialization-american-business/. 
 18.  JULIA GUMY, CIVIC CONSULTING OF THE CONSUMER POLICY EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, THE 
OVER-INDEBTEDNESS OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS: UPDATED MAPPING OF THE SITUATION, NATURE 
AND CAUSES, EFFECTS AND INITIATIVES FOR ALLEVIATING ITS IMPACT—PART 2: COUNTRY REPORTS 
459–61 (2013); Cardesín, supra note 10, at 299 (“Mass access to housing ownership was achieved 
through over-indebtedness [in Spain]. National mortgage debt increased twelvefold, and household 
indebtedness soared from sixty-two percent of disposable income (1995) to 130% (2008). By the end of 
this period, forty percent of privately-owned main homes were mortgaged.”); Vicente Salas & Jesús 
Saurina, Deregulation, Market Power and Risk Behavior in Spanish Banks, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 1061, 
1061 (2003); Pablo Martín-Aceña, Maria A. Pons, & Concepción Betrán, 150 Years of Financial 
Regulation in Spain. What Can We Learn?, 43 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 35, 66 (2014) (describing the removal 
of certain regulatory requirements thereby allowing more entrants to the lending industry); BANCO DE 
ESPAÑA, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AND BANKING CRISIS IN SPAIN, 2008-2014 30–35 (2017) 
(discussing the liberal granting of credit by lenders for residential home purchases and unrealistic 
expectations regarding future increases in home value as contributing to the real estate bubble of the Great 
Recession). 
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lending practices pursued included: overvaluation of residential properties, 
extending excessive credit, placing unsuspecting and inadequately protected 
individuals on loans as guarantors, sometimes listing them on several 
mortgages through a technique known as  “crossed” or “chained” 
mortgages,19 and targeting undercapitalized and marginalized groups for 
residential mortgage loans with unfavorable terms.20 
In the pre-2008 global recession years of wishful expansion, Spain 
created a permissive environment for banks, promoting economic growth 
and homeownership over consumer protection.21 Courts enforced the terms 
of private lending contracts dictated by the banking industry; the national 
laws offered little relief from harsh residential mortgage contracts.22 Unlike 
the United States, all residential mortgage loans in Spain, unless negotiated 
to be otherwise, are recourse loans.23 Under a recourse loan, if a homeowner 
defaults on the loan, the bank can still hold him personally liable for any 
remaining difference between the value of the house and the outstanding loan 
amount after foreclosure.24 Personal debt remains after the initial auction 
“even after the bank has sold the house for a higher value of the awarding 
 
 19.  SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3. 
 20.  Fiona Ortiz, Insight: Spain’s Jobless Immigrants Take on Banks over Mortgages, REUTERS 
(Mar. 26, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-evictions/insight-spains-jobless- 
immigrants-take-on-banks-over-mortgages-idUKBRE82P0DL20120326; OBSERVATORIO & 
PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, HOUSING EMERGENCY IN SPAIN: THE CRISIS OF 
FORECLOSURES AND EVICTIONS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 11 (2013). 
 21.  Leslie Crawford, Boomtime Spain Waits for the Bubble to Burst, FIN. TIMES (June 8, 2006, 3:00 
PM), http://www.afi.es/EO/ftimes%20080606.pdf. 
 22.  GUMY, supra note 18, at 466 (noting the absence of legal protections for defaulted borrowers 
in connection with debt collection); Ciaran Giles, European Court Says Spanish Eviction Laws Illegal, 
SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Mar. 14, 2013, 5:02 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-european-
court-says-spanish-eviction-laws-illegal-2013mar14-story.html; Ilan Brat & Christopher Bjork, Spain 
Aims to Ease Foreclosure Laws, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424127887324073504578113070533092166; Stephanie Bodoni, Spain Too Fast to 
Evict in Mortgage Disputes, EU Court Rules, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:44 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-14/spain-too-fast-to-evict-in-mortgage-disputes-eu-court-
rules-1-. 
 23.  Art. 1911 C.C. (Spain) (“The debtor is liable for the performance of his obligations with all 
present and future authority.”). 
 24.  This outcome is grounded in the “unlimited personal liability” principle. Pablo Gutiérrez de 
Cabiedes and Marta Cantero Gamito explained that: 
Article 1911 of [the] Civil Code establishes [this rule] as an absolute principle, in a categorical 
and solemn way: ‘The debtor is liable for the performance of his obligations with all his assets, 
present and future.’ And according to Article 105 of Mortgage Law, enacted in 1946, ‘The 
mortgage . . . will not alter the unlimited personal liability of the debtor provided in Article 
1911 of the Civil Code.’ 
Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Marta Cantero Gamito, Country Report Spain, in CONSUMER DEBT AND 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE 67, 74 n.43 (Hans-W. Micklitz & Irina Domurath eds., 2015); Suzanne 
Daley, In Spain, Homes Are Taken but Debt Stays, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/world/europe/28spain.html. 
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price.”25 Following the foreclosure sale, through which either the lender 
repossesses the property or a third party purchases it, if there is a remaining 
mortgage debt balance, the lender may obtain a judgment and pursue the 
foreclosed borrower for the deficiency amount.26 The borrower may be 
subject to wage garnishment to satisfy the debt.27 This practice has left many 
defaulted and evicted borrowers in debt without any prospect of repayment. 
Further, because residential mortgage debt is not contained within the 
purview of Spain’s insolvency law,28 personal bankruptcy does not offer a 
viable option.29 
Prior to the Great Recession, expensive housing was readily available30 
in contrast to the insufficient availability of affordable rental options.31 
Rental housing composed a mere eleven percent of Spain’s housing 
inventory in 2014.32 People were induced to buy rather than rent, not only 
because of low-income rental inventory shortages, but also because of the 
comparative costs.33 In the years leading up to the 2008 recession, rental 
 
 25.  Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 74. 
 26.  See Inés Benítez, Spain’s New Eviction Law “Protects Banks,” INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS 
AGENCY (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/spains-new-evictions-law-protects-banks 
(explaining that under Spanish law, people are required to pay off mortgage, interests, and late fees even 
after they have been evicted and their home has been repossessed). 
 27.  Due to the recourse nature of Spain’s residential loans, the real estate does not serve as the only 
security for the loan. Borrowers are personally liable for the debt. The personal liability aspect of the loan 
means that, with a court order, lenders can pursue a borrower’s other assets, including income. Manuel 
Castilla Cubillas, Non-Recourse Mortgages and the Prevention of Housing Bubbles—A Proposal for a 
Change in the Default Rule on Mortgage Liability in Spain, 25 HOUSE FIN. INT’L 15, paras. 2.1, 3.5, 17 
(2011) (discussing the recourse character of Spain’s residential loans and the personal liability of the 
debtor); SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3, 58, 61. 
 28.  Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 83. 
 29.  Id. at 78. 
 30.  From 1997 to 2007, “Spain built more houses than the number of new-builds in France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom combined, and the real estate and construction constituted as much 
as forty-three percent of the nation’s GDP.” SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 14 (citation omitted); see 
also WILLIAM CHISLETT, A NEW COURSE FOR SPAIN: BEYOND THE CRISIS 118–19 (2016) (discussing 
the quick increase and plummet of construction in real estate). 
 31.  See generally Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of 
the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development—Addendum: 
Mission to Spain, 7–9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/16/Add.2 (Feb. 7, 2008) (identifying that Spain has a 
constitutional right to adequate housing but that there are factors that negatively impact the right); 
Asunción Blanco-Romero et. al., Barcelona, Housing Rent Bubble in a Tourist City. Social Responses 
and Local Policies, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 4, 6 (2018). 
 32.  SUNDERLAND, supra note 14; Joris Hoekstra et al., Recent Changes in Spanish Housing 
Policies: Subsidized Owner-Occupancy Dwellings as a New Tenure Sector?, 25 J. HOUS. AND THE BUILT 
ENVIRON. 125, 125 (2010). 
 33.  It is important to note that housing prices from 2000 to 2008 dramatically increased relative to 
income. Hoekstra, et al., supra note 32, at 126, 128–29 (commenting that in certain years preceding the 
recession, Spain experienced “a declining interest rate, better and easier access to mortgages, longer 
BARNES_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
2020] REFRAMING HOUSING 99 
rates, in some instances, exceeded the initial costs of a mortgage.34 For those 
in need of more affordable options or government subsidies, the state and the 
market were largely unresponsive.35 Public housing, also known as social 
housing, accounted for “two percent of the total housing stock,” according 
to 2014 figures.36 Thus, financed ownership was a logical alternative to 
relatively high rental rates.37 The government’s emphasis on home sales 
imposed significant costs on the quality of life for Spain’s residents. 
According to one estimate, 39.4% of workers’ income was allocated towards 
paying down housing loans.38 High unemployment rates, topping off at 
twenty-five percent, also complicated matters.39 For those inclined to rent, 
the transitory nature of employment made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
secure rental apartments. 
Over-indebtedness, difficulties in managing debt, and unemployment 
prompted massive loan defaults.40 Over-indebtedness refers to a condition in 
which the cost of debt related to housing, credit cards, food, health expenses, 
 
mortgage terms and an increasing share of households with two wage-earners.”). If one considers the 
availability of mortgage loans along with the pricing rate, tax incentives, and opportunity to build equity 
as compared to paying rent, purchasing a home for some appeared to be the more attractive option. See 
Montserrat Pareja-Eastaway & María Teresa Sánchez-Martínez, Spain, in PRIVATE RENTAL HOUSING: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 89–90 (Tony Crook & Peter Kemp eds., 2014); see also Nayla Fuster et 
al., From a Culture of Homeownership to Generation Rent: Housing Discourses of Young Adults in Spain, 
22 J. YOUTH STUD. 585, 588 (2019). 
 34.  SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 3 (describing how banks marketed mortgages of 100 percent 
or more of the cost of property, making it more attractive than renting for high prices). 
 35.  See generally Montserrat Peraja Eastaway & Ignacio San Martín Varo, The Tenure Imbalance 
in Spain: The Need for Social Housing Policy, 39 URB. STUD. 283 (2002) (discussing how the rental 
sector in Spain evolved into a highly liberalized market that has failed to address the limited availability 
of rental housing). 
 36.  SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 5. 
 37.  See Kothari, supra note 31, at 10–12 (discussing how families have benefitted from financial 
help for housing). 
 38.  Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 69. 
 39.  See Daley, supra note 24 (reporting that Spain had the highest unemployment rate in the euro 
zone in 2010 while real estate prices simultaneously were dropping); see generally SUNDERLAND, supra 
note 14 (explaining the impact of unemployment on renting and mortgages). 
 40.  See Iain Ramsay, Two Cheers for Europe: Austerity, Mortgage Foreclosures and Personal 
Insolvency Policy in the EU, in CONSUMER DEBT AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at 
189, 215 (exploring EU credit and over-indebtedness regulation); Francisco Carballo-Cruz, Causes and 
Consequences of the Spanish Economic Crisis: Why the Recovery is Taken so Long?, 3 
PANOECONOMICUS 309, 316 (2011) (discussing the role of the real estate and banking sector in the 
Spanish housing crisis); Ozlem Akin et. al., The Real Estate and Credit Bubble: Evidence from Spain, 5 
SERIES 223, 226, 239–40 (2014) (identifying both bank agency problems and behavioral motives as 
drivers of  the housing bubble); see also GUMY, supra note 18, at 458–71 (discussing the level, nature, 
and drivers of over-indebtedness in Spain); BANCO DE ESPAÑA, supra note 18, at 85–86, 93 (discussing 
the increase in “nonperforming loans” for households from 2008 to 2011). 
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and other items, exceeds income and asset levels.41 Because a substantial 
portion of the household’s available income is earmarked for paying the debt, 
there is no expendable income. While many found themselves in this 
situation, it failed to elicit sympathetic responses from banks active in the 
Spanish market. Assisted by rigid national mortgage procedural laws and 
lender-friendly mortgage contracts, banks aggressively initiated foreclosure 
proceedings. From 2007 to 2012, lenders repossessed over 400,000 homes.42 
By 2017, in the wreckage of rental and mortgage-based evictions, “nearly 
two million Spaniards [could not] afford a decent place to live”43 and, 
according to a non-governmental organization’s (“NGO”) 2014 report on 
Spain, there were an estimated “40,000 homeless people and [an] additional 
1.5 million families living in shelters.”44 Although thousands were unhoused 
and destitute during the crisis,45 “3.5 million residences – or 13.7 percent of 
 
 41.  CIVIC CONSULTING OF THE CONSUMER POLICY EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, THE OVER-
INDEBTEDNESS OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS: UPDATED MAPPING OF THE SITUATION, NATURE AND 
CAUSES, EFFECTS AND INITIATIVES FOR ALLEVIATING ITS IMPACT—PART I: SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS 3–
4 (2013); see also GUMY, supra note 18, at 458–71. 
 42.  Judith Sunderland, drawing from statistics furnished by the Bank of Spain, reports: 
In May 2013, the Bank of Spain published its own figures for the first time. These data were 
updated in January 2014, when the Bank of Spain also provided data on the first half of 2013, 
suggesting an increase in repossessions by banks. For 2012, the Bank of Spain reported 39,051 
repossessions of primary residences. In the first half of 2013, 28,170 primary residences were 
repossessed. 
SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 16 (citation omitted). 
 43.  Sam Edwards, Homelessness in Spain Is on the Rise, and Owners Are Getting Rough as They 
Try to Get Squatters Out, NEWSWEEK (June 19, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
homeless-spain-squatting-owners-getting-creative-627190. 
 44.  Global Homelessness Statistics, HOMELESS WORLD CUP FOUND., https:// 
homelessworldcup.org/homelessness-statistics/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020); see Francisco Lirola, A Night 
on the Street with Madrid’s Homeless, HUFFPOST (July 27, 2016, 1:11 P.M.), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/madrid-homeless_us_5798c7e6e4b01180b5310c2f (discussing 
homelessness in Spain as a growing problem); see also Inés Benítez, The Invisible Reality of Spain’s 
Homeless, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/10/the-
invisible-reality-of-spains-homeless/ (discussing Spain’s citizens that live in poverty or are homeless). 
 45.  See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, There’s a Lesson in Spain’s Surreal, Unfinished Cities, 
HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2016, 5:11 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/spain-empty-
cities_us_56ba6221e4b0b40245c47dff (explaining the abandonment of development projects after the 
housing bubble burst); Lauren Frayer, In Spain Entire Villages Are up for Sale—And They Are Going 
Cheap, NPR: MARKETS (Aug. 23, 2015, 7:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/23/ 
433228503/in-spain-entire-villages-are-up-for-sale-and-theyre-going-cheap (describing the increase in 
abandoned villages); Barry Keith, A Symbol of Spain’s Housing Crisis Finds a Community, BLOOMBERG 
CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:46 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/a-symbol-of-spains-
housing-crisis-finds-a-community/536280/ (detailing how in 2008 only twenty percent of apartments 
were sold in a housing complex in El Quiñón); Nick Whigham, This Is What it Looks Like When a Credit 
Fueled Housing Bubble Bursts, NEWS.COM.AU (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.news.com.au/ 
technology/environment/natural-wonders/this-is-what-it-looks-like-when-a-credit-fuelled-housing-
bubble-bursts/news-story/b3b877d3012fbeb35b2a71 64ad2ec548 (discussing the collapse of Spain’s 
housing market and the remaining abandoned real estate projects as a result). 
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the total housing stock” remained vacant.46 Ghost towns in search of foreign 
investors sprang up.47 In the wake of this stark reality, a squatters’ movement 
was born— squatters “reclaimed” property that they viewed as having been 
illegitimately taken from them by the banks and government.48 
The socio-economic devastation pointed to the government’s 
misalignment of incentives and public interest goals. Spain needed to 
develop comprehensive and effective housing policies. The seriousness of 
having the fourth largest economy in the EU enthralled in economic disaster 
became evident.49 Spain was long overdue for housing law reforms. The 
harsh response from the financial sector and the government set the stage for 
change, forged an agenda, and pushed thousands of bodies out onto the street 
in protest.50 
III.  INNOVATIVE ACTIVISM—THE LANGUAGE AND ACTION OF 
PROTEST 
Renters, squatters, the homeless, and debtors besieged the streets with 
entreaties that the state respond to their suffering. “H for Housing,” “Homes 
not Hotels,” and “Stop the Displacements” signs filled the space of the urban 
commons expressing the drama of Spain’s cataclysm of housing and 
homelessness.51 The imaginations of international institutions were stirred to 
 
 46.  SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 14; Cardesín, supra note 10, at 298 (“Spain was the second 
country in the EU in terms of the percentage of empty houses and second homes.”). 
 47.  See Frayer, supra note 45. 
 48.  See Edwards, supra note 43. 
 49.  The first decades of this century with respect to the global economy have been characterized 
by uncertainty. The fragility of the EU is at the forefront of discussion. Brexit is a major source of anxiety. 
Without a coherent blueprint for disentangling the UK from an integrated market and for post-Brexit EU, 
there is reason for concern about what the impending divorce portends. This is also a time of reflection 
regarding the various nations that comprise the EU and their significance to its survival and economic 
welfare. Peter S. Goodman, Preparing for ‘Brexit,’ Britons Face Economic Pinch at Home, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/business/economy/britain-economy-election-
brexit.html. 
 50.  See generally ADA COLAU & ADRIÀ ALEMANY, MORTGAGED LIVES: FROM THE HOUSING 
BUBBLE TO THE RIGHT TO HOUSING (Michelle Teran & Jessica Fuquay trans., 2012) (analyzing the 
housing crisis and right to housing movement in Spain). The protests continued in later years in response 
to budget restrictions and Spain’s high unemployment rate. Paul Day, Tens of Thousands in Spain Protest 
Economic Policy, Corruption, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2013, 3:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
spain-protests/tens-of-thousands-in-spain-protest-economic-policy-corruption-idUSBRE91M0E220130 
223. 
 51.  See generally García-Lamarca, supra note 11 (discussing the “H for Housing” group and their 
efforts to mobilize for accessible housing); Benítez, supra note 26 (detailing the Platform for Mortgage 
Victims movement and its responses to the housing crisis); Holly Ellyatt, Spain Politicians to be Fenced 
off from Evictions Protesters, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2013, 1:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/04/ 
11/spain-politicians-to-be-fenced-off-from-evictions-protesters.html (“Spanish police will erect barriers 
around politicians’ residences to shield them from protests over the growing number of home evictions 
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respond to a state in crisis.52 Their responses altered the legal landscape of 
private contracts in the housing sector. Activists’ appeals were clothed in the 
language of human rights and legal rights53 conferred by Spain’s 
Constitution, EU laws, and international conventions. The rallying cry, 
“dación en pago” (deed in lieu of foreclosure), emerged.54 The protestors’ 
 
and to call for changes to mortgage laws.”); Tom Burridge, Spanish Protest Movement Fights Housing 
Evictions, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17067246 (discussing 
ongoing protests for housing in response to banks repossessing homes); Lauren Frayer, Spaniards Take 
to Streets to Block Home Evictions, NPR: EUROPE (Nov. 13, 2012, 1:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2012/11/13/165025717/spaniards-take-to-streets-to-block-home-evictions (discussing the lengths 
protestors and people losing their homes will go to keep their homes and have better access to housing); 
Gerry Hadden & Marco Werman, After Public Outcry, Spain Reviews Eviction Laws, WORLD (Nov. 12, 
2012, 12:50 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-11-12/after-public-outcry-spain-reviews-eviction-
laws (discussing the growth of eviction protests throughout cities in Spain that have largely been ignored 
by politicians); Spanish Activists Protest at Eviction Laws, DAILYMOTION (July 21, 2011), 
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xk162m. 
 52.  See generally Stephanie Bodoni, Spain Too Fast to Evict in Mortgages Disputes, EU Court 
Rules, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:44 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-
14/spain-too-fast-to-evict-in-mortgage-disputes-eu-court-rules-1- (explaining that courts must be 
allowed to ask for eviction cases to be halted pending a determination on the validity of underlying loan 
agreements); Ilan Brat & Christopher Bjork, Spain Aims to Ease Foreclosure Laws, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
11, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324073504578113070533092166 
(highlighting how Spain had aimed to ease the penalties from foreclosure laws); Ilan Brat & Gabriele 
Steinhauser, EU Court Rules Against Spanish Mortgage Laws, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:19 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578360271750843386 (noting that EU 
court rulings have made it more difficult for Spain to ease the burden of foreclosure); Tobias Buck, EU 
Court Strikes Down Spain’s Eviction Law, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
16e37aca-8ca5-11e2-8ee0-00144feabdc0 (detailing how Spanish eviction law improperly precludes the 
application of EU law); European Court Rules Against Spanish Eviction Laws, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21789650. 
 53.  Human rights organizations were heavily involved in delineating the issues of the moment and 
the root causes of the problems. Their work is interconnected with the activism that emerged in the 
unfolding and aftermath of the 2008 recession. Leaders of social movements have been instrumental in 
shaping the language of activists’ demands. Ada Colau’s role in the development of PAH connects 
activism and legal discourse. Colau was trained as a human rights lawyer. In June 2015, she was elected 
as the Mayor of Barcelona. Raphael Minder, Spain’s Local Election Results Reshape Political Landscape, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/world/europe/spains-local-election-
results-reshape-political-landscape.html; Dan Hancox, Is This the World’s Most Radical Mayor?, 
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ada-colau-
barcelona-most-radical-mayor-in-the-world. In her writings, Colau publicized the plight of embattled 
borrowers and the homeless. Notably, she, along with Adrià Alemany, published Mortgaged Lives, which 
chronicles the government decisions and other factors leading to Spain’s housing crisis as well as PAH’s 
genesis. Colau’s new position symbolizes a crossing of boundaries between the various realms of protest, 
public, and private. Her new status grants her a privileged platform from which she can wield power to 
realize the fundamental changes in economic policy and housing that she advocated for as a PAH leader. 
Another example of the relationship between activism and human rights organizations is the work of 
Housing Rights Watch (“HRW”). HRW conducts workshops on housing to inform people of their rights 
and provides a venue for brainstorming strategies. See Samara Jones, Editorial, NEWSLETTER (Hous. 
Rights Watch, Brussels, Belg.), Oct. 2014, at 1. 
 54.  José Coy, founder of one of the branches of PAH writes, “Even pronouncing dación en pago 
without tripping up my tongue was a challenge. These days, it’s difficult to find someone in Spain who 
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tactics of resistance illustrate Robert Cover’s point that “an act signifies 
something new and powerful when we understand that the act is in reference 
to a norm.”55 Spain’s civil procedure laws, as discussed in Part V, were 
structured to protect lenders. Spanish courts treated private mortgage and 
rental contracts as sacrosanct, even if they inflicted substantial harm on 
individuals. Residents, rather than banks, were asked to cover the national 
excesses as part of Spain’s compliance with the austerity measures imposed 
by the EU56; the government was not transparent regarding its interests in the 
housing sector leading to rising land costs, affordable housing shortages, 
which in turn resulted in higher housing costs, evictions, and homelessness.57 
Activists decried the norms that prioritized corporate and government 
interests over social welfare. Gathering in public spaces, filing lawsuits,58 
sit-ins in financial institutions,59 physically blocking evictions, mobilizing 
bank customers to assemble on bank property to destroy their credit cards 
and close their accounts,60 and squatting, were techniques that activists 
deployed to vocalize their demands for changes in housing laws and the 
 
doesn’t know what it means, and it has turned into a permanent in the political and social agenda.” José 
Coy, Prologue to COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 19, 21. 
 55.  Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983). 
 56.  See Interview by Christopher Alessi with Megan Greene, Senior Fellow at the Mossavar-
Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard Kennedy School (Sept. 28, 2012), 
https://www.cfr.org/interview/spain-doubles-down-austerity (explaining how Spain’s austerity measures 
pushed new taxes on individuals); see also Day, supra note 50 (explaining that wide spread protests broke 
out in response to the Spanish government’s austerity measures); Raphael Minder, Despite Public 
Protests, Spain’s 2013 Budget Plan Includes More Austerity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/global/spain-unveils-sweeping-budget-cuts.html 
(highlighting the removal of tax breaks for home purchases and an increase in the tax on lottery winnings). 
 57.  Kothari, supra note 31, at 15–17, 27–29; Cardesín, supra note 10, at 300–01; U.N., Econ. & 
Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views Adopted by the Committee Under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with Regard to 
Communication No. 5/2015, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 (June 20, 2017) [hereinafter MBD]. 
 58.  See e.g., Ceesay Ceesay v. Spain, App. No. 62688/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). This case, known 
as the “Bloc Salt case,” involved forty homeless individuals, organized by PAH, who took over an 
abandoned building, located in a town called Salt in Catalan Spain. The European Court of Human Rights 
decided that the government could not summarily remove the squatters without having created a post-
eviction plan for housing them. To evict the squatters without providing for a contingency plan would 
violate the ECHR, specifically Article 3, which prohibits “inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment,” and Article 8, which recognizes the right to “respect for privacy and family life.” 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 3, 8, opened for 
signature Apr. 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR] (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953). 
 59.  See Rafael Carmona & Sonia Olea Ferreras, Feature Interview: Plataforma de Afectados por 
la Hipoteca: A New Social Movement for Housing Rights, NEWSLETTER (Hous. Rights Watch, Brussels, 
Belg.), Oct. 2014, at 6. 
 60.  See Spain’s ‘Indignados’ Protest Foreclosures by Closing Their Bank Accounts, THE 
OBSERVERS (May 15, 2012, 6:12 PM) [hereinafter Spain’s ‘Indignados’] http://observers.france24.com/ 
en/20120515-spain-indignados-protest-foreclosures-closing-bank-accounts-bankia-madrid-home-
housing-crisis-loans-debt (detailing the protests to government inaction over evictions). 
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government’s austerity policies. As Cover argues, regarding the 
interconnectedness of social protest and norms, “this characteristic of certain 
lawbreaking . . . gives rise to special claims of civil disobedience.”61 The 
protestors’ engagement with government policies infused their political 
action with legitimacy;62 however, political action through protest is at once 
productive and confining in that boundaries are imposed on the demands by 
pre-existing legal structures and language. Public protests illuminated 
Spain’s deficiencies in fulfilling the housing needs of its citizens. They also 
drew attention to Spain’s outstanding obligations as an EU Member: the 
mandate to comply with the UCT Directive. 
Cover’s insight regarding the signifying power of law is illustrated by 
both the activists and government. Cover notes that law may function as “a 
resource in signification that allows us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, 
mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify.”63 The protestors, in part, drew upon 
legal language to articulate their struggle. The government’s action of 
drafting legislation to reform mortgage laws worked to validate that struggle. 
Validation is an act of conferring dignity. Human dignity moves from 
abstraction to embodiment (i.e. the lived experience) when people 
experience actions and conditions that do not offend their sensibilities as 
human beings and when a level of existential decency becomes the norm. 
One manifestation of human dignity occurs when the law provides 
individuals with protections from more powerful parties. 
Widespread evictions spurred the mobilization of groups such as 
“Platform for those Affected by Mortgages” (PAH). After several highly 
publicized suicides of debtors,64 PAH and other activists called for 
government intervention.65 PAH and “H for Housing” emerged as critical 
 
 61.  Cover, supra note 55, at 8. 
 62.  For example, squatters maintained that they were homeless because of the government’s failure 
to designate sufficient subsidized housing. Melissa García-Lamarca describes PAH’s housing 
reclamation project: 
Obra Social seizes the social function of housing, ensuring that families engaged with the PAH 
who are facing eviction and have exhausted all housing options are not left living in the street, 
and pressures the public administration at different levels to guarantee the universal right to 
housing. In both collective and individual occupations, the aim is to regularize a family’s 
situation by negotiating a social rent with the bank, ideally in the same flat/building. 
García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 50. 
 63.  Cover, supra note 55, at 8. 
 64.  Sonya Dowsett, Insight: In Spain, Banks Buck Calls for Mortgage Law Reform, REUTERS (Feb. 
26, 2013, 7:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-mortgage-reform/insight-in-spain-banks-
buck-calls-for-mortgage-law-reform-idUSBRE91P09Q20130226. 
 65.  See OBSERVATORIO & PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, supra note 20, at 13–
15. 
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voices demanding changes in Spain’s housing laws.66 Barcelona in 2009 was 
the site of PAH’s genesis.67 The organization initially trained its attention on 
the harmful practices of banks and the inadequacies of Spain’s laws 
regarding protection for mortgage consumers.68 As PAH grew in political 
influence, it broadened its concerns to other social issues including rental 
evictions, the lack of affordable housing, and unemployment.69 PAH is self-
described as: 
a non-partisan’s citizens movement comprising more than 190 nodes 
across the Spanish state . . . tak[ing] action in many forms-from the 
emotional to the political; media-facing, legal, public communication and 
beyond - to seek changes in the law that respond to the human rights 
violations suffered by those affected; and . . . [to] propose solutions that 
make the right to housing a reality for everyone.70 
Housing organizations, like PAH, remolded individual complaints “into 
collective public concerns.”71 They gave expression to the harms that 
individuals experienced in their private transactions and delivered those 
issues, newly reimagined, to the public in a transformative manner. Rather 
than dismissing individual foreclosures and evictions as discrete tête-à-têtes 
between borrowers and lenders, or landlords and tenants—which would 
remain largely shuttered to the public’s eye—activists characterized the 
private actions as national existential threats.72 Recasting the private as 
public was essential to persuading the government and lending institutions 
to view the problems as national and global concerns, rather than as 
individual private transactions.73 Publicizing the private harms served 
another function, as well: individuals realized the commonality of their 
 
 66.  There were important antecedents to these groups, such as the 15-M anti-austerity plaza 
occupations of May 2011 and #nolevotes (“don’t vote for them”), whose founder was a Spanish lawyer. 
 67.  García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 45. 
 68.  THE PLATFORM FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY MORTG., THE PAH’S GREEN BOOK: A BASIC GUIDE 
TO THE PAH 5 (2016). 
 69.  Carmona & Ferreras, supra note 59, at 6. 
 70.  See THE PLATFORM FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY MORTG., supra note 68. 
 71.  García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 45. 
 72.  See COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 85–89 (explaining how the V de Vivienda 
movement’s capacity to connect with public opinion was driven by its “direct, communicative 
campaigns” and how the movement blossomed into the PAH ); see also Raquel Castillo Lopez, Protests 
Become Way of Life in Spanish Recession, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/uk-spain-protests/protests-become-way-of-life-in-spanish-recession-idUKBRE90K0JB20130121 
(describing Spanish protests to rent payments); Lauren Frayer, Spaniards Protest High Rate of 
Foreclosures, Debt, VOICE OF AM. (July 26, 2011, 8:00 PM), voanews.com/Europe/Spaniards-protest-
high-rate-foreclosures-debt (discussing protests in Madrid); Andy Robinson, The Deepening Spanish 
Debt Crisis, NATION (July 3, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/deepening-spanish-debt-
crisis/ (discussing protests in Andalusia). 
 73.  COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50. 
BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
106 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:91 
housing and debt problems, which worked to uplift them psychologically.74 
Rather than being resigned to solitary struggle, individuals were empowered 
in knowing that they were part of a movement for systemic change.75 
Characterizing the private as public also allowed the international 
community to draw other connections. Not only do evictions imperil Spain’s 
future, they also impact the sustainability of the EU— having fiscally healthy 
consumers is relevant to the success of the EU, which benefits from reliable 
markets.76 
The various government responses to PAH’s litigiousness and activists’ 
campaigns illustrate the dynamic exchanges between public and private 
sectors. PAH’s Citizens Legislative Initiative was a significant campaign 
that led to the Government’s adoption of Law 1/2013,77 which reformed 
Spain’s mortgage system. Because of gaps and ambiguities, which were 
highlighted by activists and clarified by the ECJ, the government revised 
Law 1/2013 and crafted new ones.78 
 
 74.  Id. at 49. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  The Preamble of the UCT makes express the relationship between the welfare of consumers 
within Member States and the EU: 
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the 
citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are 
governed by the laws of Member States other than its own, it is essential to remove unfair terms 
from those contracts. 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 29 [hereinafter Council Directive 93/13]. 
 77.  Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Gamito, supra note 24, at 78. 
 78.  While the interaction between the State and public has yielded certain positive outcomes, it is 
important to recognize that the government has not always been receptive to activism. In some instances, 
when individuals have gathered to peaceably protest the inordinate power of banks and their negative 
consumer policies, they have met police action. For example, when some protesters assembled to close 
their bank accounts, the police apprehended them, recording their names and other identifying 
information, so that fines could later be imposed for engaging in “unauthorized protests.” Spain’s 
‘Indignados’, supra note 60; see also COLAU & ALEMANY, supra note 50, at 21 (noting that the media 
and state reacted coldly to initial popular movements for reform). A more aggressive government 
response was crystallized in the infamous gag law of 2015, known as The Citizen’s Security Law. Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy was in power when Spain’s parliament passed the law. Maria Roson, Restoring 
Freedom of Expression in Spain: End the ‘Gag Law,’ EDRI (June 27, 2018), https://edri.org/restoring-
freedom-of-expression-in-spain-end-the-gag-law/. The new law had the effect of outlawing protests 
altogether. The law subjects “protesters [to] . . . a range of punishments, depending on the circumstances. 
They include a possible fine of 30,000 euros ($31,800) for protesting in front of the Congress or other 
parliament buildings.” Jethro Mullen, Virtual Protest: Demonstrators Challenge New Law with 
Holograms, CNN (Apr. 12, 2015, 5:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/12/europe/spain-hologram-
protest/index.html/. Not to be deterred, individuals protested by projecting holograms against a house of 
the lower parliament. The activists projected themselves in specters of undefeated resistance, daring the 
State to arrest them. Id. The text of the law can be accessed here: Disposiciones Generales (B.O.E. 2015, 
77) (Spain), http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/leyes_espa/lo_004_2015.pdf. 
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IV. STRUCTURING HOUSING CLAIMS THROUGH LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
Many legal avenues availed themselves for the expression of protesters’ 
demands. The activists sought equitable treatment in their housing contracts, 
flexibility towards late payments, and government responsiveness to their 
housing needs, including debt forgiveness and affordable housing.79 As a 
prelude to my analysis of the paradigmatic cases, the following provides an 
overview of the legal instruments available to litigants for housing claims.80 
This sheds light on the structuring of the cases and the legal entities that will 
probably private housing transactions. 
The cases examined herein are primarily grounded in the UCT 
Directive and in the ESCR treaty, rather than Spain’s constitutional right to 
housing, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter or Charter),81 
or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Nonetheless, it is 
important to be cognizant of the alternative resources that support 
conceptualizing government social welfare obligations, in relation to 
consumer protection and redistribution. While all the aforementioned legal 
instruments furnish protections to individuals with respect to housing, the 
extent of the protection varies depending upon the adjudicating entity (i.e. 
whether they are regional supranational tribunals or international 
committees), the ostensible goals and purposes of the legal instruments 
invoked, and their judicial interpretations. 
A. Protections at the National Level: The Spanish Constitution 
Spain’s right to housing is enshrined in Article 47 of the national 
constitution. Article 47 declares the government’s responsibility to provide 
services and protect its citizenry from socio-economic harms. Although its 
scope remains unclear, the right sets out what the state must provide to its 
populace in declaring that, “[a]ll Spaniards are entitled to enjoy decent and 
 
 79.  OBSERVATORIO & PLATFORMA DE AFECTODOS POR LA HIPOTECA, supra note 20, at 13–15. 
 80.  For a summary of relevant legal instruments for European housing claims, see FEANTSA, 
HOUSING-RELATED BINDING OBLIGATIONS ON STATES FROM EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL CASE 
LAW 1–16 (2016). 
 81.  Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao and Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU are notable exceptions. 
There, the applicants relied upon the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Directive. However, 
their reference to the Charter was based upon the guarantee in Article 47 of an effective remedy, as 
opposed to the right to housing in Article 34.3 or the right to “private and family life, home, and 
communications” contained in Article 7. See cases cited infra note 97 and note 200. Kušinova v. Smart 
Capital a.s. also resorts to the EU Charter. See case cited infra note 268. Like Sánchez Morcillo and 
Naranjo, Kušinova does not invoke the article on housing, but rather draws upon Article 38, which 
ensures a certain degree of consumer protection. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, art. 38, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 403 [hereinafter EU Charter]. 
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adequate housing.”82 It imposes governmental obligations to fulfill the right 
by requiring, “public authorities” to “promote the necessary conditions 
and . . .  establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, 
regulating land use in accordance with the general interest in order to prevent 
speculation.”83 The constitutional right incorporates a pledge that the 
“community shall participate in the benefits accruing from the urban policies 
of the public bodies.”84 It affirms the government’s obligation to remain 
mindful of its duties to the public in administering housing and other matters 
and in designing land use planning and policies. At the time the cases 
discussed herein were decided, Spain’s constitutional court had not 
interpreted Article 47 as covering residential mortgages and remedies for 
defaulted borrowers. According to Housing Rights Watch: “It is precisely 
because of the lack of powerful tools in domestic law to adequately protect 
the right to housing, that lawyers have been forced to use the existing judicial 
instruments and tools at [the] European and international level[s].”85 
B. Protections at the Transnational European Level 
1. UCT Directive and Private Contracts 
For EU mortgage consumers,86 the UCT Directive is the logical 
instrument to remedy their claims regarding unfairness in mortgage loan 
contracts, predation, and procedurally biased processes weighted in favor of 
lenders.87 In part, plaintiffs’ counsel was inspired to bring the cases discussed 
herein because Spain’s government had yet to fully incorporate the UCT 
Directive into the legal fabric of domestic law, despite the Directive having 
been in effect since 1993.88  The UCT Directive is aimed at a variety of 
private contracts, including debt instruments.89 With some exceptions, it 
 
 82.  CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  State of Housing Rights in Spain, E-NEWSLETTER (Hous. Rights Watch, Brussels, Belg.), Apr. 
11, 2018. 
 86.  Note that the term “mortgage consumers” is intended to include borrowers and guarantors. 
 87.  A recent addition to the consumer protection framework that has a direct bearing on the conduct 
of lenders is the EU Mortgage Credit Directive (sometimes “MCD”) which became effective in 2016. 
Council Directive 2014/17/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 60) 34 [hereinafter Council Directive 2014/17/EU]. To 
ensure the implementation of MCD’s reforms, the European Commission threatened to bring Spain, and 
several other countries, before the ECJ. See ACN, Brussels to Take Spain to Court if It Fails “to Enact 
Rules on Mortgage Credit,” CATALAN NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:23 PM), https://www.catalannews.com/ 
politics/item/brussels-to-take-spain-to-court-if-it-fails-to-enact-eu-rules-on-mortgage-credit. 
 88.  Coy, supra note 54. 
 89.  Council Commission Notice: Guidance on the Interpretation and Application of Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 2019 O.J. (C 323) 5–10 [hereinafter 
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covers consumers, sellers, and suppliers operating within the EU orbit.90 A 
primary rationale informing the Directive is that the removal of unfair 
contract terms facilitates well-functioning markets.91 The Directive insists 
on a uniform baseline level of treatment for parties in the negotiation and 
enforcement of debt transactions and other consumer contracts.92 It 
accomplishes this in several ways: articulating conditions under which 
unfairness arises; focusing attention on whether the consumer is impacted 
negatively as a sign that unfairness exists; offering exemplars of unfairness; 
and furnishing a sample list of unfair terms.93 
The nomenclature, “consumer citizen,”94 is of particular significance in 
the parlance of EU legislation.95 Here, the consumer citizen is a citizen of the 
EU, of a nation state, and of the global market. The Directive defines 
“consumer” as “any natural person who, in contracts covered by . . . [the 
UCT Directive], is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, 
or profession.”96 The Directive and the ECJ’s jurisprudence are mechanisms 
for intervening in private law transactions and undoing contracts in the name 
of consumer protection. Both recognize that, “the consumer is in a weak 
position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards to both his bargaining 
power and his level of knowledge.”97 Focusing on the well-being of 
consumers opens the door for reimagining rules which ultimately serves the 
redistributive goal of protecting the vulnerable. This reframing also serves 
efficiency goals in that the costs of protection are spread throughout the 
market rather than placed disproportionately on those least able to shoulder 
them. 
 
Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC] (listing some of the varied contracts to which the UCT Directive 
pertains). 
 90.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76 (holding that Spain, as a member of the EU, is subject 
to the Directive). 
 91.  Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76. 
 94.  Michelle Everson & Christian Joerges, Consumer Citizen in Postnational Constellations? 10 
(EUI Working Paper Law No. 200647, 2006) (theorizing about consumer interaction with law in the 
moment of post-nationalism by examining a WTO Report on genetically modified organisms). 
 95.  The Preamble to the UCT Directive states: 
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the 
citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are 
governed by the laws of Member States, other than his own, it is essential to remove unfair 
terms from those contracts. 
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl. (emphasis added). The Preamble further speaks in terms 
of “[c]ommunity citizens as consumers.” Id. 
 96.  Id. at 29–30, art. 2(b). 
 97.  Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 22 (July 17, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823. 
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In contrast to the emergent political and economic conditions preparing 
the way for new national housing policies, the legislative and judicial 
pathways were less well-defined. Although the European Union adopted the 
UCT Directive as early as 1993, the ECJ had yet to weigh in on its meaning 
for housing contracts. Numerous Member States, like Spain, were slow in 
fully implementing the EU legislation within their national legal 
frameworks, even as late as 2013, the date of the Aziz decision. Also, there 
were lingering questions about how best to address the homeless and other 
populations in need of additional governmental support, such as immigrants 
without established supportive familial networks. The cases analyzed in the 
following section illustrate how rules for mortgage and housing markets 
emerged out of governmental interactions with international institutions such 
as the ECJ and the ESCR Committee. I further claim that public activism 
instigated and informed the cases. The multiplicity of discursive regimes 
means the individual, who is more than a consumer citizen,98 can bring 
several claims. 
2. European Union Charter 
The EU Charter offers another avenue to bring housing claims. The 
Charter pertains to EU Member States and institutions.99 It expressly 
articulates human rights laws and ideals,100 although it is influenced by the 
ECHR.101 Article 34.3 of the EU Charter states: “the Union recognises and 
respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent 
existence for all those who lack sufficient resources.”102 The Charter contains 
 
 98.  The term “consumer” has a duality to it. On the one hand it underscores the fundamental 
significance of individuals as purchasers within a global economy. On the other hand, the term is limiting 
in that it empties out the humanity of individuals and defines them in terms of specific narrow roles that 
are played out in economic markets: accumulator and exchanges of currency. 
 99.  The EU Charter “draws on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the European 
Social Charter and other human rights conventions, the constitutional conventions common to EU 
Member States, and the [ECJ]’s case law.” FRANCESCA FERRARO & JÉSUS CARMONA, FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF THE CHARTER AFTER THE LISBON TREATY 3 (2015). 
 100.  Note that EU Members are also obligated to adhere to the ECHR. However, the interpretation 
of the Convention is within the competency of the ECtHR, not that of the ECJ. The ECJ is authorized to 
interpret and apply the Charter. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the 
Charter was recognized by EU Member States as having legally binding effect. 
 101.  FERRARO & CARMONA, supra note 99. 
 102.  The full text of Article 34 paragraph 3 states: 
In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to 
social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient 
resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and 
practices. 
EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 34. Other EU-grounded international legal instruments relevant to housing 
rights include: The Treaty of the EU, Anti-discrimination Legislation, and the EU Agency for 
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other rights related to housing: the right to “respect for private and family 
life, home and communications”;103 the consumer protection right;104 the 
protection of family life;105 and the right to access of services of general 
economic interest.106 
While the Charter incorporates a right to housing, the right, as 
formulated, does not clearly state that it pertains to mortgage loan contracts 
or that its scope is broad enough to provide relief to overindebted defaulted 
borrowers. However, if the right is to be meaningful and effective, one 
should be able to rely upon the language, the “right to social and housing 
assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient 
resources,” to make the case that it encompasses: access to affordable 
properties for rent and purchase; government protection from predatory 
loans and predatory landlords; relief from procedurally unfair foreclosures 
and evictions; the procurement of reasonably priced mortgages with clearly 
disclosed terms; opportunities to modify housing contracts when necessary; 
and the ability to be released from the terms of a mortgage upon the return 
of the collateral. 
Whether the ECJ will interpret the Charter to include the interests of 
overindebted or defaulted borrowers remains unresolved. There is some 
basis for extending that protection if the Court looks to Article 38, which 
requires that “Union policies . . . ensure a high level of consumer 
protection.”107 It is also unclear how the ECJ will analyze claims grounded 
in the Charter in conjunction with (or apart from) those grounded in the UCT 
Directive. In other words, whether new cases in which the ECJ expressly 
engages with Charter-based rights to housing claims will contribute to the 
new public-private housing law framework, or whether the Court’s rulings 
will focus solely on the human rights obligations of governments, essentially 
preserving a separation between private and public law matters. Regardless, 
it is important to recognize that interpreting the Charter is within the 
competency of the ECJ and there will likely be future cases in which the 
Court has opportunities to further bridge the realm of private residential 
housing contracts with public social justice concerns that are, in part, 
encapsulated by the right to housing. It is probable that, in terms of influence 
within the EU, the Charter may serve as a more formidable connector to the 
 
Fundamental Rights. See EU Housing Rights, HOUSING RIGHTS WATCH, (Oct. 10, 2013), http:// 
www.housingrightswatch.org/page/eu-housing-rights. 
 103.  EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 7. 
 104.  Id. art. 38. 
 105.  Id. art. 33. 
 106.  Id. art. 36. 
 107.  Id. art. 38. 
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private law realm than the rulings of the ESCR Committee.108 This is because 
the Charter “enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy, thanks to its ratification 
by all Member States on behalf of their citizens[.] . . . [T]he EU Charter can 
be described as the outcome of a pan-European political consensus which 
should frame both the activity of the EU legislature and EU judges.”109 
3. European Court of Human Rights 
While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has addressed 
matters concerning human rights related to housing,110 and has a broader 
constituency,111 its case law is not the focus of this study for several reasons. 
First, there is no express right to housing in the Convention. Instead, 
complainants may draw upon a cluster of rights that the Court has interpreted 
as affording some protection to individuals with respect to housing in cases 
alleging that human rights have been compromised due to forced evictions 
or a government’s failure to furnish public housing.112 Notably, Article 8 
 
 108.  From the standpoint of having a direct effect on government action, Spain is unlikely to view 
the UNESCR Committee as carrying the same degree of weight as the ECJ. Nonetheless, the purpose of 
including the international committee cases in this analysis is to underscore the contribution the 
Committee makes to the conversation regarding the appropriate scope of housing protections. There is an 
ongoing dialogue concerning the public/private divide and the proper regulatory frame for dealing with 
banks, governments, landlords, etc. Infractions of international human rights norms always carry with 
them the threat of reputational harm. In terms of compliance, Spain is more likely to comply with ECJ 
decisions because of the EU’s enforcement mechanisms and because publicity concerning its failure to 
adhere may be construed as a rejection of its EU obligations. 
 109.  FERRARO & CARMONA, supra note 99, at 10. 
 110.  See Tchokontio Happi v. France, App. No. 65829/12 Eur. Ct H. R. (2015), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-153911 (holding that France was in violation of the Convention in that it 
had failed to comply with a final judgment of the Paris Administrative Court and ordering that the 
applicant be re-housed in satisfactory accommodations, as required by the national law known as DALO). 
The Court specifically noted that France could not circumvent compliance by way of “a State 
authority . . . cit[ing] the lack of funds or other resources as an excuse for not honoring, for instance, a 
judgment debt.” Id. at 12. The ECtHR held that France’s procrastination was a violation of Article 6 §1 
(right to a fair trial) of the Convention. Id. The Happi decision is notably different from South Africa’s 
landmark case, Government of The Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). If adopted, under the Happi framework, South Africa could arguably be required to redistribute 
land to achieve substantive equality. See also V.M. v. Belgium, App. No. 61025/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-169047 (concerning whether degrading living conditions led to the 
death of applicant’s daughter); Winterstein v. France, App. No. 27013/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162215 (finding a violation of Article 8). The ECtHR has made clear 
in cases such as Moldavan v. Romania that the quality of housing matters. Press Release, Registrar of 
Eur. Ct. H.R., Chamber Judgment Moldovan and Others v. Romania No. 2 (Dec. 7, 2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-1393399-1454825. 
 111.  The ECtHR is responsible for interpreting the Convention for the Council of Europe’s forty-
seven members. See 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-
members-states (last updated Sept. 3, 2020). 
 112.  See, e.g., F.J.M v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 76202/16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188124 (discussing the application of Article 8). See also Council of 
Europe Housing Rights, HOUSING RTS. WATCH, http://www.housingrightswatch.org/page/council-
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recognizes, “[e]veryone has a right to respect for private life, his home and 
his correspondence.”113 Second, ECtHR cases operate under a different 
framework.114 The ECtHR has not developed jurisprudence expressly 
contemplating how mortgage loan debt instruments intersect with housing 
rights.115 While cases grounded in Convention rights involving private loan 
or rental contracts could be configured, the current ECtHR housing 
jurisprudence is substantively different. Notwithstanding these differences, 
the ECtHR will become a more visible part of the new paradigm because of 
the size of its membership and influence.116 As the ECJ continues to expand 
its jurisprudence on the UCT Directive—incorporating reasoning informed 
by human rights ideals—it is likely to consider decisions of the ECtHR in 
interpreting the right to housing. The legal instruments that the ECJ will be 
ruling on, however, will be the UCT Directive and the Charter. 
C.  Protections at the International Level: ICESCR 
The international human right to housing, enshrined in Article 11(1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), and further addressed in General Comments 4 and 7, recognizes 
that individuals are entitled to housing as essential to their basic dignity.117 
Spain, as a ratifying member of the treaty since 1977, is obligated to 
incorporate the right within its domestic legal system to meet its international 
obligations.118 Spain’s consent to the Optional Protocol means that it 
 
europe-housing-rights (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (“The right to housing is enshrined in numerous 
concrete legal norms . . . right to life, prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, right to a 
fair trial, right to respect for private and family life, right to an effective remedy, prohibition of 
discrimination, protection of property.”); EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDE ON 
ARTICLE 8: RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE (2020) 
(explaining Article 8 and analyzing its case law). 
 113.  ECHR, supra note 58, art. 8. 
 114.  The limited number of ECtHR decisions addressing housing do not concern the realm of 
financial debt instruments. Both are central to my analysis. The extension of the conceptualization of 
public protections into the private, by way of private contracts of debt or leasing, and the importation of 
private law concepts into the public sphere, are primary subjects of this Article. 
 115.  It is also not clear that the right to housing helps the homeless in that it may be interpreted to 
protect only those who are property owners or tenants. See Council of Europe Housing Rights, supra note 
112 (explaining that the right to housing is not explicitly provided for in the ECHR, but rather enshrined 
in legal norms). 
 116.  See European Social Charter (Revised), paras. 16–17, 30, 31, May 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163 
(detailing the rights of family and children, the right to social protections, and enshrining the right to 
housing). 
 117.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 118.  Spain initially signed the treaty on September 28, 1976. It then ratified it on April 27, 1977. 3. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
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acknowledges the competence of the ESCR Committee to hear individual 
claims grounded in treaty rights.119 Individuals have prevailed upon the 
Committee to resolve housing rights matters. As the analysis in the following 
section demonstrates, the Committee’s rulings are crucial to the conceptual 
move towards incorporating public law principles into private arrangements. 
V. HOUSING CONTRACTS THROUGH THE LENSES OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE LAW 
A. The ECJ and Consumer Protection in Private Housing 
Mapping the relevant terrain of private and public law is necessary to 
my analysis: examining the specific judicial and legislative action that 
constitutes the reframing, intervening in the scholarly debates on the 
necessity of public and private law boundaries, and highlighting the new 
approach to housing markets. With respect to the first objective, the ECJ 
decisions and those of the UN ESCR Committee are essential resources not 
only for identifying the dominant private and public law concepts at play but 
also for providing contextual examples to give insight to the interfusion. 
1. Aziz: Beginning to Reframe Private Housing 
Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya120 is essential to the 
jurisprudential reframing of private housing transactions in Europe. The ECJ 
ruled that some of Spain’s procedural rules regarding mortgage contracts 
conflicted with the UCT Directive’s goal of protecting consumers.121 Where 
consumers seek a ruling challenging the fairness of their contractual terms, 
courts hearing such challenges must be able “to grant interim relief, 
including, in particular, the staying of those enforcement proceedings, where 
the grant of such relief is necessary to guarantee the full effectiveness of 
[their] final decision[s].”122 Rather than providing a definitive statement on 
the characteristics of an unfair term or ruling on whether the terms of the 
contract in Aziz were unfair, the ECJ offered guidance on evaluating a term’s 
 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4& 
clang=_en (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
 119.  On May 5, 2013, the Protocol entered into force and Spain acceded on September 23, 2010. 3.a 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=IV-3-a&chapter=4 (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
 120.  Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415 (Mar. 14, 
2013). 
 121.  Id. ¶ 59. 
 122.  Id. ¶¶ 59, 64. 
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unfairness.123 The case marks a judicial moment of reflection on the status 
of mortgage consumers in relation to lenders and the relationship of both 
parties to domestic procedural laws governing their contractual enforcement 
rights. Aziz ventures into new territory.124 The ECJ, a supranational court, 
conceptualized a complex set of rights that pertain to housing from the 
starting place of private contractual terms in mortgage loan agreements. The 
decision has ramifications for how interactions between borrowers and 
lenders are structured and for the obligations it imposes on states to devise 
fair procedural rules regarding the treatment of residential loan debtors and 
creditors. 
Mr. Mohamed Aziz initiated his case in commercial court (i.e. the 
Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 3 de Barcelona) to undo Caixa Bank’s mortgage 
enforcement proceedings against him and to protest the bank’s repossession 
of his home.125 He took out a loan with Caixa Bank for the principal amount 
of EUR 138,000.126 His 33-year loan term ran from August 1, 2007 to July 
31, 2040.127 Aziz initially made payments in compliance with his monthly 
mortgage obligation,128 but then missed several installments.129 In response, 
Caixa, acting under the authority of the loan terms, accelerated his loan130 
and sought repossession which was granted by a court charged with hearing 
mortgage enforcement proceedings, known as the Court of First Instance and 
Instruction No. 5 Martorell.131 At the Juzgado de lo Mercantil, Mr. Aziz 
raised questions about the fairness of his mortgage contract. When the 
commercial court sought guidance in the form of a preliminary ruling132 
 
 123.  Id. ¶¶ 65–66. 
 124.  See Irina Domurath & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in CONSUMER DEBT AND SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at 3, 4–5 (highlighting the issuance of the Aziz decision as a 
watershed moment). 
 125.  Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700 (Nov. 8, 2012), http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129481&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18301774. The enforcement case was initially brought before the 
Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 5 de Martorell. Id. para. 23. 
 126.  Id. para. 12. 
 127.  Id. para 13. 
 128.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 23. 
 129.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 18. 
 130.  Id. para. 19. Acceleration refers to the lender’s power to demand that the borrower pay off the 
entire outstanding loan balance upon the borrower’s failure to fulfill certain obligations under the loan 
agreement. 
 131.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL. 62011CJ0415, ¶ 26. 
 132.  As the Court of Justice for the European Union explains in its recommendations to national 
courts: 
The reference for a preliminary ruling . . . is a fundamental mechanism of EU law. It is designed 
to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of that law within the European Union, by 
offering the courts and tribunals of the Member States a means of bringing before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) for a preliminary ruling questions concerning the 
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concerning the interpretation of the directive, the case made its way to the 
First Chamber of the ECJ.133 Additionally, the national court prevailed upon 
the ECJ to assess whether Spain’s civil procedural rules, which precluded 
debtors from raising fairness arguments regarding their mortgage loan terms, 
contravened the directive134 and whether certain terms and provisions of Mr. 
Aziz’s contract would be invalidated in light of the ECJ’s interpretation.135 
a. Background 
Spanish civil procedure laws severely restrict parties in the arguments 
and defenses they may assert in an enforcement proceeding.136 Within the 
contracted time frame of the proceeding, Mr. Aziz was limited to several 
arguments. He could argue that the debt sought had previously been paid and 
retired.137 He could assert that the creditor had miscalculated the amount due 
on the “closing balance” of the account between the two parties.138 Last, he 
could maintain that there was another debt with priority over the one being 
foreclosed.139 Omitted from the options was an opportunity for Mr. Aziz to 
challenge the fairness of his mortgage loan’s contractual terms.140 The 
avenue available for borrowers to initiate this type of challenge at the time 
was instead through a civil proceeding.141 That approach was unsatisfactory 
because if Mr. Aziz disputed the contract in the civil venue, the court would 
 
interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union. 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation 
to the Initiation of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, para. 1, 2012 O.J. (C 338) 1, 1. A preliminary ruling 
by the ICJ is “binding both on the referring court and on all courts in EU countries.” Preliminary Ruling 
Proceedings—Recommendations to National Courts: Summary of Recommendations to National Courts 
on the Use of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), EUR-LEX (Oct. 31, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14552. 
 133.  The first stage of the transnational legal process typically involves the issuance of an opinion 
by an Advocate General (AG). EUR. PARLIAMENT, ROLE OF ADVOCATES GENERAL AT THE CJEU 4–5 
(2019). An AG is a member of the ECJ. Id. at 1. The AG’s opinion typically includes: an introduction to 
the case, relevant laws and legal context, statement of facts, the reason that the national court is seeking 
a preliminary ruling, and the AG’s well-considered judgment regarding how the matters raised should be 
resolved. Id. at 4–5. Although the ECJ judges are not bound by the AG’s opinion, they often influence 
the ECJ’s decisions. Id. at 1. 
 134.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 31(1), 32. 
 135.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 136.  Id. ¶ 54 (referencing L.E. Civ., art. 695 (Spain)). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 54. 
 140.  Id. ¶ 54. 
 141.  L.E. Civ. art. 698(1) (Spain); Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, 
para. 25 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129481 
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18301774. 
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lack the authority to stay the mortgage enforcement process.142 Even if his 
claim proved meritorious, he risked being permanently dispossessed of the 
property.143 When Mr. Aziz complained of the limited nature of the 
enforcement proceedings, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil referred the matter to 
the ECJ. As an initial step, the Advocate General made recommendations144 
that were then transmitted to the Court’s first chamber for a preliminary 
ruling.145 
Aziz’s loan was plagued by several detrimental characteristics. The 
contract precluded any flexibility in the borrower’s repayment schedule. 
Instead, it permitted Caixa to demand payment of the entire loan upon the 
borrower’s failure to timely submit any of the scheduled monthly 
payments.146 The contract terms also permitted Caixa, without any input 
from Mr. Aziz, to state the amount due and owing by providing the court 
with a certified statement.147 Although he received notice, Mr. Aziz was not 
actually entitled to notice of his default under the mortgage documents.148 
The agreement also provided that upon default, all amounts due and owing 
(i.e., principal and interest) would be subject to the hefty default interest rate 
of 18.75%.149 Because Caixa was allowed to accelerate,150 it meant that the 
18.75% interest rate was applied to the entire outstanding balance, not just 
to the missed monthly payments.151 The default interest was “calculated on 
a daily basis.”152 Following Aziz’s failure to make his monthly payment, 
 
 142.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 55 (referencing L.E. Civ. art. 698 (Spain)). 
 143.  The ECJ noted that: 
[U]nder Spanish rules of procedure, the final vesting of mortgaged property in a third party is 
always irreversible, even if the unfairness of the term challenged by the consumer before the 
court hearing the declaratory proceedings results in the annulment of the mortgage enforcement 
proceedings, except where that consumer made a preliminary registration of the application for 
annulment of the mortgage before that marginal note. 
Id. ¶ 57. 
 144.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 64, 76; see Stina Haglund, The Role of the Advocate General 
and the Development of Direct Effect, ÖREBRO UNIVERSITET: EU CONST. L. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2012), 
https://eulaworebro.wordpress.com/2012/08/13/the-role-of-the-advocate-general-and-the-develo pment-
of-direct-effect/ (“The role of the Advocate General is to propose an independent legal solution . . . . [T]he 
Court is not obligated to follow the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General.”). 
 145.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 30. 
 146.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 14, 69. 
 147.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 22. 
 148.  According to the facts, the bank did notify Aziz regarding the initiation of the process. Id. ¶¶ 
14, 20–21. 
 149.  Mr. Aziz’s mortgage started at the low “teaser” annual interest rate of 4.87% for a little over a 
year (17 months). After that, the loan was subject to a variable rate linked to the Euribor (plus 1.10%). 
Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 13, 15. 
 150.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 21. 
 151.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, paras. 15, 81. 
 152.  Id. para. 14. 
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Caixa filed an action seeking to collect the outstanding amount including 
contractual and default interest.153 Caixa sent Mr. Aziz notice of the action. 
When he failed to pay the stated amount, Caixa initiated the enforcement 
proceeding, which included foreclosure.154 In order to halt the procedure, 
Aziz would have needed to pay “the unpaid contractual instal[l]ments at the 
time of enforcement, plus interest, costs and disbursements relating to those 
instal[l]ments.”155 
The absence of any competitive bidders at the public judicial auction 
foreclosure made it possible for Caixa to assume title of Aziz’s home.156 
Under Spanish mortgage law at the time of the proceeding, banks were 
permitted to take title to foreclosed homes at fifty percent of their appraised 
value, assuming the absence of any higher bids at the auction.157 Taking 
advantage of this, Caixa assumed ownership of his home for EUR 97,200.158 
This was drastically lower than EUR 194,000, which was Caixa’s valuation 
of the property at the time Aziz entered into the loan agreement.159 Because 
Aziz had a recourse loan and the value credited for the property did not cover 
the outstanding balance, he continued to owe the bank even after he was 
evicted.160 His remaining indebtedness totaled approximately EUR 
40,000.161 
Aziz did not participate in the enforcement proceeding,162 which was 
conducted before the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 5 de Martorell.163 
Instead, several months after its conclusion, as the court awarded the 
property to the bank, Aziz filed his case before the Commercial Court No. 3 
of Barcelona. He challenged the terms of his loan agreement and sought to 
annul the proceedings granting the bank his home.164 Prior to referring the 
matter to the Advocate General, the commercial court drafted a more 
extensive list of matters on which it sought guidance.165 
 
 153.  Id. paras. 21–23. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. para. 26. 
 156.  Id. para. 28. 
 157.  Id.; C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 26 (Mar. 
14, 2013). 
 158.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 28. 
 159.  Id. paras. 12, 17; SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 49. 
 160.  Aziz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:700, para. 28. 
 161.  Id. paras. 20, 22, 28. 
 162.  Id. para. 26. 
 163.  Id. para. 23. 
 164.  Id. para. 29; C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 
27 (Mar. 14, 2013).. 
 165.  See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 30. 
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Reviewing the elements of Mr. Aziz’s case establishes a foundation to 
understand the private contractual and procedural landscape confronting 
Spain’s residential borrowers before the ECJ’s interpretation of the UCT 
Directive. This context is essential to appreciating the difference the 
Directive makes. Further, the background is necessary to my response to the 
scholarly debate between private law purists and public law enthusiasts in 
Part VI. 
b. Procedural Ruling 
The first part of the ECJ’s ruling pertains to procedure. Specifically, 
Member States cannot both exclude the possibility of challenging the 
validity of the contractual terms of the mortgage during enforcement 
proceedings and deny any means of relief in an alternative judicial forum.166 
The government must grant borrowers some venue to contest the substance 
of their loan agreements. The disjuncture between consumer relief and 
creditor enforcement violates the “principle of effectiveness.”167 The 
principle is salient to whether the objectives of the Directive can be met or 
whether they are frustrated by domestic laws. The Court interpreted 
“effectiveness” to mean that a remedy equal to what the plaintiff is seeking—
in this instance, undo the foreclosure so that Aziz could retain his property—
was required.168 A monetary remedy under these circumstances would be 
insufficient.169 The Court opined that Member States must establish a judicial 
process that has the competency to resolve cases that raise unfairness issues 
with respect to residential mortgage loans.170 Courts should be able to 
intervene in or delay enforcement proceedings, where necessary, to provide 
borrowers with judicial relief where borrowers challenge the substance of 
the mortgage agreement, including the inequity of its terms.171 Furthermore, 
where the national court determines that a contractual term is unfair, there 
must be a process to ensure removal of the term from future consumer 
contracts. 172 
 
 166.  Id. ¶¶ 64, 77. 
 167.  Id. ¶ 63. 
 168.  Id. ¶ 60. 
 169.  Id. ¶ 63 (“[T]he Spanish legislation at issue . . . makes the application of the protection which 
the directive seeks to confer on . . . [mortgage] consumers impossible or excessively difficult.”); see 
Fernando Gómez Pomar & Karolina Lyczkowska, Spanish Courts, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, and Consumer Law, INDRET, Oct. 2014, at 15–16 (Spain) (discussing the effect that the Judgment 
of 14th March 2013 (Case C-415/11, Aziz) had on Spanish Law). 
 170.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 49, 52, 59, 63–64. 
 171.  Id. ¶ 64. 
 172.  Id. ¶¶ 60, 77. 
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c. Substantive Ruling—Test for Unfairness 
The second part of the ruling relates to the question of what constitutes 
an unfair term and provides guidelines for national courts to make that 
determination.173 Article 3(1) of the Directive deals with the matter of 
unfairness and provides: 
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated 
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of  
the consumer.174 
An initial step towards determining unfairness is assessing the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract.175 The question of 
whether the parties engaged in contractual bargaining to establish the terms 
of the deal is paramount.176 Absence of negotiation is signaled by a contract 
that “has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been 
able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a 
pre-formulated standard contract.”177 Although Article 3 does not use the 
same term, the description provided fits what American law refers to as a 
contract of adhesion.178 As in the United States, contracts of adhesion in the 
EU framework are not necessarily illegal or unconscionable, and, therefore, 
the legality determination has to be made separately. There are many 
circumstances under which such contracts or terms will be upheld as valid.179 
 
 173.  Id. ¶ 66. 
 174.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76. The directive was subsequently amended by Council 
Directive 2011/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer 
Rights. Council Directive 2011/83, art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 71. 
 175.  See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 74, 76–77(2); Council Commission 
Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 4, 5–6, 11. 
 176.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 74, 76–77(2). Council Commission 
Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5–6, 11. 
 177.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 3(2); see Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v. 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para 5(2) (July 17, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823. 
 178.  Such contracts have generated considerable debate, suspicion, and disdain in the United States. 
A contract of adhesion is “a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agreement, usually presented to a consumer 
by a business entity.” Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 
28 YALE J. REG. 313, 346 (2011) (footnote omitted); see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: 
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1983) (“Contracts of adhesion—standard 
form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—are ubiquitous in modern commercial life . . . .”). 
The UCT Directive is particularly concerned with addressing unilateral boilerplate contracts and “the 
unfair exclusion of essential rights in contracts.” Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl. (internal 
quotations omitted). Because of the absence of meaningful choice or ability to bargain on the part of the 
weaker party, many scholars have heavily criticized this type of agreement. 
 179.  Such contracts have not been declared per se illegal because many recognize efficiencies 
associated with standardization. Schwartz, supra note 178, at 354. 
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The determination of whether the formulation of the contract grew out of 
unilateral or mutual bargaining sets up further inquiry into contractual 
unfairness.180 
The Directive offers some insight into what good faith requires. Where 
a party is unduly advantaged and the consumer is significantly disadvantaged 
to the point of inflicting harm on the latter, good faith has not been met. The 
ECJ strikes a balance between consumer and supplier181 in ruling that the 
relevant inquiry is whether “the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and 
equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer 
would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract 
negotiations.”182 As I argue in Part VI, this test is not an easy one to 
administer. It not only requires a court’s assessment of what is fair and 
equitable, but also what would be a reasonable assumption on the part of the 
seller concerning the contractual terms presented to a consumer. 
The Directive uses the phrase “significant imbalance” to evaluate 
unfairness. The phrase refers to the positioning of the parties. Determining 
whether a significant imbalance exists “requires an examination as to how a 
contract term influences the rights and obligations of the parties.”183 Parties 
establish and define the terms of their contracts in the first instance. 
However, as the Aziz Court recognized, once a contract is formed, a party 
may contest the fairness of a term by alleging it causes a significant 
imbalance; meaning that it unduly burdens the complainant party in his 
performance.184 National courts must evaluate the challenged term in relation 
to national laws to determine whether “the contract places the consumer in a 
legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in 
force” and, if this is the case, to what degree.185 For example, if national law 
requires that borrowers be given sixty days advance notice before filling 
enforcement proceedings, a contract that suspends with notice or adopts a 
shorter notice period will be heavily scrutinized. Nonetheless, even though 
 
 180.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 69, 77(2); Council Commission Notice 
93/13/EEC, supra note 89, at 5–6, 11. 
 181.  The UCT Directive Preamble instructs: 
. . . in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the 
bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the 
term and whether the goods and services were sold or supplied to the special order of the 
consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier 
where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has taken 
into account. 
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, pmbl. 
 182.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 69. 
 183.  Council Commission Notice 93/13/EEC, supra note 89, para. 3.4.1. 
 184.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 68, 77(2). 
 185.  Id. 
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the contract is unfavorable towards the borrower, it still may fall within legal 
bounds.186 It is noteworthy that the Member State is implicated in the 
assessment of contractual fairness. According to the ECJ, it is necessary to 
consider “the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at 
his disposal, under national law, to prevent continued use of unfair terms.”187 
The Court’s ruling reveals its contemplation of the power differential 
between consumers, corporations, and governments. Governments, 
typically, are endowed with greater powers to impose even-handed terms in 
transactions. 
To facilitate a court’s determination of whether unfair terms are present, 
the Directive includes a list of examples illustrating how unfair terms 
operate. For example, a term or contractual clause, “enabling the seller or 
supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason 
which is specified in the contract,” may be held as unfair.188 The ECJ ruled 
that the list must be interpreted in the same manner as the Directive describes 
it. That is, it should be viewed as an “indicative” but “non-exhaustive list of 
the terms which may be regarded as unfair.”189 The absence of a term from 
the list, should not be deemed as dispositive of the issue of whether it is 
unfair. Once a judicial determination of unfairness has been rendered, the 
Directive requires that the term or contractual provision be excised from the 
contract.190 
Aziz highlighted both the acceleration clause, which enabled Caixa to 
establish the default interest rate, and the clause that permitted Caixa to 
unilaterally calculate the outstanding balance.191 Because the domestic court 
has the initial responsibility to assess the unfairness of contractual terms,192 
the ECJ declined to rule upon the contract’s substance.193 Instead, the Court 
imposed guidelines that national courts should consider.194 National courts 
must: balance the import of the consumer’s breach with the overall substance 
and goals of the contract to determine if acceleration is warranted;195 consult 
 
 186.  Id. ¶ 77. 
 187.  Id. ¶ 77(2). 
 188.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 3(3), annex para. (j). 
 189.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 70, 77; Council Directive 93/13, supra 
note 76, art. 3(3). 
 190.  See Gómez Pomar & Lyczkowska, supra note 169 (noting that under Spanish Law a clause 
must be eliminated after being held unfair and replaced by the applicable default legal regime to fill the 
gap in the contract). 
 191.  Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 65. 
 192.  Id. ¶¶ 66–67. 
 193.  Id. ¶ 66. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Specifically, the ECJ ruled that the national court must consider: 
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national law and, in particular, the statutory interest rate to determine 
whether the challenged interest rate falls within those boundaries;196 consider 
whether the term challenged is in the vein of the agreement between the 
parties or whether there is an apparent conflict between the term and the 
nature of the agreement that would ultimately impair the consumer’s ability 
to protect himself against the threatened harm. 
The relevance of the Aziz decision lies in the protective space it carves 
out for consumers in the domain of housing. The Court articulated a 
framework for assessing the unfairness of residential mortgage loan terms.197 
The interpretation of the UCT Directive provides litigants with a basis to 
challenge their contractual terms and the domestic procedural rules 
pertaining to housing transactions. Member States are also put on notice of 
their obligations to make domestic procedural rules conform to Directive 
mandates. Freedom of contract is constrained by the principle of unfairness; 
unfair contracts will not be enforced. 
2. Elaborating Principles of Consumer Protection 
The ECJ’s revisiting of the UCT Directive in Sánchez Morcillo and 
Abril Garcia v. Banco Bilbao,198 a year later, followed by the cases Unicaja 
Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo Rueda et al.199 and Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco 
S.A.U.,200 confirm that the Court has more than a fleeting interest in 
addressing inequities in private housing transactions and procedural 
inequalities accruing to the benefit of corporate and government interests.201 
The following decisions clarify rights, obligations, and duties of Member 
States and lenders. The cases evidence an ongoing dialogue with Spain, and 
 
. . . whether the right of the seller or supplier to call in the totality of the loan is conditional 
upon the non-compliance by the consumer with an obligation which is of essential importance 
in the contest of the contractual relationship in question, whether that right is provided for in 
cases in which such non-compliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount 
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant applicable rules and whether national 
law provides for adequate and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a term to 
remedy the effects of the loan being called in. 
Id. ¶ 73 (emphasis added). 
 196.  Id. ¶ 74. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099 (July 17, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid 
=155118&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18291823. 
 199.  Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 & C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, SA v. Hidalgo 
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482 (Jan. 21, 2015). 
 200.  Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016 
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
 201.  See Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, paras. 37, 44–45; see also Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 23; Gutiérrez Naranjo, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 
62015CJ0154, ¶¶ 28, 30. 
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the larger EU community, regarding private law contracts and public harm 
and demonstrate a deepening of the ECJ’s commitment to the welfare of 
housing consumers and housing markets. 
a. Expanding Procedural Protections in Morcillo 
Morcillo concerned the differential treatment accorded to lenders as 
compared to borrowers under new domestic procedural laws pertaining to 
the enforcement of mortgages.202 The ECJ scrutinized Spain’s procedural 
rules, which treated banks (suppliers) differently from borrowers 
(consumers) when bringing an appeal.203 Whereas lenders could appeal a 
court’s decision dismissing their enforcement proceedings or voiding a term, 
borrowers did not enjoy the same latitude. Without the ability to appeal a 
“judgment at first instance,”204 they had no mechanism to halt their mortgage 
enforcement proceedings despite underlying fairness issues concerning the 
mortgage contract.205 Cases, like Morcillo, chronicle the country’s fretful 
process of revising its mortgage laws contemporaneously with the Aziz 
decision in order to bring them in conformity with the UCT Directive. Law 
1/2013 is one such example.206 
In Morcillo, the applicants entered into a residential mortgage loan on 
June 9, 2003 with Banco Bilbao for EUR 300,500.207 The loan provided for 
a default interest rate of “19% per annum” in contrast to the statutory interest 
of “4% per annum.”208 Some years later, after the applicants missed several 
payments, Banco Bilbao sought to collect the entire loan, including ordinary 
and default interest, in conjunction with an order for the sale of the 
mortgaged property.209 While the referring court210 limited its request for a 
 
 202.  Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 19. 
 203.  The procedural rule at issue was L.E. Civ., art. 695 (Spain). Id. paras. 37, 44–45. 
 204.  Id. para. 17. 
 205.  Id. paras. 17, 33, 42. 
 206.  Spain’s Law 1/2013 is an expansive law with numerous sections implementing protections for 
mortgage borrowers and changes to social rents. As various parts have been challenged, Spain has made 
revisions and adopted transitional legislation. The case BBVA S.A. v. Pedro Peñalva López is illustrative 
of the ongoing exchange between Spain’s legislature and the transnational court regarding what 
constitutes fairness in mortgage transactions. In BBVA, the domestic court sought a preliminary ruling 
regarding the one-month time limit for challenging enforcement of mortgage proceedings, implemented 
by the transitional law in the wake of the Aziz case. The ECJ ruled that Article 6 and 7 of the UCT 
Directive “preclud[ed] a national transitional provision . . . which . . . imposes a time-limit on consumers 
calculated from the day following the publication of that law to object to enforcement on the basis of the 
alleged unfairness of contractual terms.” Case C-8/14, BBVA S.A. v. Peñalva López, 2015 EUR-Lex 
CELEX WL 62014CJ0008, ¶ 43 (Oct. 29, 2015). 
 207.  Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 13. 
 208.  Id. para. 14. 
 209.  Id. para. 15. 
 210.  The referring court was the Audiencia Provincial de Castellón. Id. para. 16. 
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preliminary ruling to questions concerning Spain’s procedural rules and their 
compliance with Article 7 of the UCT Directive211 and Article 47212 of the 
EU Charter, it noted that loan terms like Morcillo’s default interest rate could 
be challenged for unfairness.213 
Grounding its decision in the principles of effectiveness and equality 
and the Directive’s instruction that consumers are not bound by unfair 
terms,214 the ECJ ruled that the contested rules violated EU laws.215 Because 
they granted creditors and borrowers different relief, the rules contravened 
the equality of arms principle.216 This principle requires that parties have an 
equal opportunity to present their cases before a tribunal.217 Article 695 of 
Spain’s civil procedure code significantly disadvantaged the debtor in that 
once his house was repossessed by the bank and sold, in most cases, the sale 
could not be undone. The sole remedy left to the borrower would be 
compensatory damages, an unsatisfactory substitute for the debtor’s desired 
remedy of remaining in place.218 The ECJ further concluded that Spain’s 
rules violated the effectiveness principle and frustrated the requirement of 
“judicial protection.”219 In weighing the potential harms of delaying any 
relief due to lenders, as compared to the borrowers’ “risk of losing their 
dwelling in an enforced sale,”220 the ECJ favored the latter. 
From Morcillo, one can discern a central principle mandating that even 
though the economic market grants certain participants a position of 
dominance in their contractual relations, under limited conditions, the Court 
may alter the imbalance. An essential restriction on Member States is that 
 
 211.  Article 7(1) compels Member States to “ensure that, in the interests of consumers and 
competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts 
concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.” Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 7. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 offer examples of how the prevention of unfair terms may be achieved. 
Id. 
 212.  Article 47 of the Charter guarantees the “right to an effective remedy before a tribunal.” EU 
Charter, supra note 81, art. 47. 
 213.  Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, para. 18. 
 214.  Id. para. 50. The Court explained that the objective of the rule is to “replace the formal balance 
which the contract establishes between the rights and obligations of the parties with an effective balance 
which re-establishes equality between them.” Id. para. 23. Domestic legislation precluding a mortgage 
enforcement court from reviewing the unfairness of terms in the debt contract at issue is prohibited by 
the UCT Directive. Id. paras. 24 and 26. 
 215.  Id. para. 52. 
 216.  See id. para. 49 (“The principle of equality of arms . . . is no more than a corollary of a fair 
hearing that implies an obligation to offer each party a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case in 
conditions that do not place it in a clearly less advantageous position compared with its opponent.”). 
 217.  Id. paras. 36, 38. 
 218.  Id. para. 43 (concluding that a monetary remedy would be “incomplete and insufficient”). 
 219.  Id. paras. 48–50. 
 220.  Id. para. 43. 
BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
126 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:91 
their rules must not undermine or circumvent the protections of the 
Directive.221 The procedural rules should maintain the borrower in the 
position he was in prior to the commencement of the enforcement hearing, 
in case his claim is deemed meritorious.222 
b. Remedying Substantively Unfair Agreements in Hidalgo and 
Naranjo 
i. Hidalgo 
Rather than highlighting the asymmetrical power relationships between 
banks and borrowers, in Unicaja Banco v. Hidalgo, the ECJ instructed 
domestic courts on their obligations under the Directive.223 While evaluating 
the unfairness of the default rate and the terms of acceleration, the issue of 
an ostensible conflict between Spain’s domestic law and the UCT Directive 
arose. The commercial tribunal224 referred the cases to the ECJ for a 
determination of the proper procedure once a court finds that a term is unfair. 
The essential inquiry was: after a finding of unfairness, is the deciding court 
required to void and excise an unfair term or can it modify the term, or 
substitute another, to bring it into compliance with the Directive?225 
Hidalgo226 involved several individuals who defaulted on their 
respective mortgage loans, ranging from EUR 47,000 to EUR 249,000.227 
The Unicaja Banco and Caxiabank, separately, instituted mortgage 
enforcement proceedings.228 The dispute concerned the fairness of default 
 
 221.  Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 &  C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016 
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154, ¶ 66 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
 222.  See Sánchez Morcillo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, paras. 43, 51 (suggesting that the status quo 
could be accomplished by granting the deciding court the procedural power to stay the mortgage 
enforcement proceedings). 
 223.  Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 & C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo 
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 26 (Jan. 15, 2015). 
 224.  The referring court was the Juzgado de Primera e Instrucción de Marchena (Spain). Hidalgo 
Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 23; Joined Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 & 
C-487/13, Unicaja Banco, S.A. v. Hidalgo Rueda, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CC0482, ¶ 48 (Oct. 
16, 2014). 
 225.  Hidalgo Rueda, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CC0482, ¶¶ 17, 23, 26; Hidalgo Rueda, 
2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶¶ 23, 26. Article 6 was at the center of the ECJ’s analysis. 
Article 6 requires Member States to adopt a law declaring that “unfair terms used in a contract concluded 
with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall . . . not be binding on the consumer and that the contract 
shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence.” Council 
Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 6. 
 226.  Hidalgo is composed of four cases filed by Unicaja Banco and Caixabank that were later 
consolidated. See id. ¶ 2. 
 227.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 228.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 18. 
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interest clauses.229 The clauses permitted the lenders to charge interest in 
varying amounts, from eighteen to twenty-five percent per annum.230 All the 
loans contained acceleration clauses.231 Under the terms, the banks were able 
to apply the default interest rate, which was 22.5% for the majority of 
them,232 to the entire outstanding loan balance.233 Spain’s law mandated that 
the domestic court should modify the contract by replacing the unfair term 
with an acceptable one.234 The gist of the national law was to preserve the 
contract at all costs.235 In contrast, the Directive does not authorize courts to 
substitute contractual terms.236 Nothing in that instrument grants national 
courts the power to reduce a contractual penalty once the court determines 
that the penalty clause is unfair.237 Instead, it merely dictates that unfair terms 
are not binding on consumers. Member States must take action to ensure that 
unfair terms are excised from the contract at issue and from future contracts 
between suppliers and sellers.238 The ECJ’s ruling clarified matters. Member 
States can confer this authority to modify with certain restrictions.239 That is 
essentially what Spain did with its Second Transitional Law 1/2013, which 
revised certain parts of its civil procedure laws. The ECJ concluded that a 
state may adopt a law that permits the domestic court hearing the mortgage 
enforcement proceeding to “adjust the amounts due under a term” downward 
so that they are consistent with the statutory rate.240 If, for example, a 
mortgage contract provides for a default rate of fifty percent and the statutory 
rate imposed by the government is twenty percent, the reviewing court can 
adjust the rate to no more than twenty percent. 
 
 229.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 230.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 231.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 232.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 233.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 234.  Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The language is in the codified national law, Article 83 of Royal Legislative 
Decree No 1/2007 and is part of the General Law for the protection of consumers and users and other 
supplementary laws. Approving the Revised Text of the General Law for the Protection of Consumers 
and Users and Other Complementary Laws art. 83 (R.D.L. 2007, 1). The Second Transitional Provision 
of Law No 1/2013 enacted May 15, 2013 modified Royal Legislative Decree No 1/2007, but the issue 
regarding compelling the mortgage enforcement court to modify the default interest rate remained. 
Second Transitional Provision of Law (B.O.E. 2013, 116). 
 235.  See Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 11 (quoting Article 83 of 
Royal Legislative Decree No. 1/2007) (“Only where the remaining contract terms result in an imbalance 
in the respective positions of the parties which cannot be remedied may the court rule that the contract is 
ineffective.”). 
 236.  Id. ¶ 28. 
 237.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 238.  Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, arts. 6–7. 
 239.  Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 42. 
 240.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
128 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:91 
The ECJ further explained that apart from the process, according to 
which the reviewing court acknowledges that there is a national law 
restricting the substance of the law in question, the reviewing court must 
make an independent evaluation of the fairness of the purported unfair 
term.241 Furthermore, the local court should not allow the existence of the 
national law to color its determination of whether a mortgage loan provision 
is unfair. The court should neither be inhibited in evaluating whether the 
disputed mortgage loan clause complies with the Directive nor be precluded 
from “removing that clause,” where appropriate.242 In assessing the 
unfairness of a contract term, a court should consider: (i) the “nature of the 
goods and services” that form the basis of the contract;243 (ii) “the 
consequences of the term under the [national] law applicable to the 
contract;”244 (iii) consistency between the relevant national laws and the 
Directive;245 and (iv) its duty to consider the unfairness of a contract term 
regardless of the substance of the national law.246 The Directive envisions 
that a court could remove an unfair term and the contract could continue on, 
remaining largely intact.247 There are circumstances where that is not 
possible. If removing the unfair term would result in the court nullifying the 
entire contract to the detriment of the consumer, it may substitute an 
alternative term provided that the substitute term is consistent with the 
Directive and “enables real balance between the rights and obligations of the 
parties to be restored.” 248 
Hidalgo recognized the latitude of Member States to legislate as they 
see fit, in compliance with EU law. Spain’s law compelling their courts to 
modify, rather than excise, the terms of default interest within a mortgage 
loan contract to bring it into compliance with State law standards was not 
prohibited by the Directive.249 From a consumer vantage point, the ruling 
does not adequately protect consumers from unduly onerous interest when 
the national law permits suppliers to levy extraordinarily high rates. Instead, 
the ECJ merely nudges lenders to ensure that the interest rate provisions are 
in line with prevailing contractual rates permitted by national law. To the 
extent that interest rate standards are reasonable, meaning not unduly 
weighted against consumers, the Hidalgo case is helpful to borrowers. Lower 
 
 241.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
 242.  Id. ¶ 42. 
 243.  Id. ¶ 37 (referencing Article 4(1) of the Directive). 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. ¶ 38. 
 246.  Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
 247.  See Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, art. 6. 
 248.  Hidalgo Rueda, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62013CJ0482, ¶ 33. 
 249.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
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interest rates make contracts more affordable and increase the likelihood that 
borrowers will be able to pay the default interest if their economic situation 
improves in time, or to recover some of their equity if a foreclosure sale 
occurs. Limiting what is permitted in the context of bargaining about 
contractual costs may be read as expressing concern for borrowers, which 
renders private contracts more humane. 
ii. Naranjo 
From 2013 to 2015, Aziz, Morcillo, and Hidalgo, built a formidable 
edifice in the name of consumer protection. A year later, Naranjo v. Cajasur 
Banco S.A.U., deepened the reach of the ECJ into matters of private 
residential mortgage contracts.250 Naranjo tackled two prickly issues. One 
concerned the extent to which lenders are able to retain the benefits of their 
wrongdoing.251 The other dealt with the power of national courts to restrict 
the scope of their rulings upon a finding that a contractual term is unfair.252 
Naranjo involved three separate lenders253 and cases that were later 
consolidated, after referral to the ECJ.254 The disputed loan term was a floor 
clause. Floor clauses operate to limit the degree to which a mortgagor can 
benefit from decreases in the interest rate index to which his mortgage is 
pegged. The clause establishes a base rate of interest that the mortgage 
consumer would have to pay even when the prevailing mortgage rate is 
substantially lower. The borrowers sought to have their floor clauses 
nullified and further demanded reimbursement of the excess amounts they 
had paid, previously, as a result of the unfair term’s application.255 
In a separate prior collective action case, Spain’s Supreme Court (i.e. 
the Tribunal Supremo) held that the floor clauses were unfair and void 
because of the lenders’ failures to inform borrowers that their mortgage 
contracts contained floor clauses and explain the meaning and effect of such 
provisions.256 The Tribunal concluded that the omissions violated the 
Directive’s requirements of “good faith, balance and transparency.”257 
 
 250.  See generally Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur 
Banco SAU, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154 (Dec. 21, 2016) (analyzing whether floor clauses 
are permissible in mortgage loans agreements). 
 251.  Id. ¶¶ 28, 30. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  The individuals filed cases in various national commercial and provincial courts, against three 
separate banks: Cajasur Banco S.A.U., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, Banco Popular Espanol. 
Id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 37. 
 254.  Id. ¶¶ 43–45. 
 255.  Id. ¶¶ 28, 31, 38. 
 256.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 257.  Id. 
BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
130 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:91 
Emphasizing the importance of consumer knowledge, the Naranjo Court 
reasoned that information concerning “contractual conditions and the 
consequences of entering into the contract” are essential ingredients to 
consumer decisions about whether to become a party to the mortgage loan 
transaction.258  When lenders conceal such information, the court must take 
this fact into account when evaluating the unfairness of the terms 
challenged.259 Regarding the question of the retroactive application of its 
ruling, the Tribunal Supremo grounded its decision on the principle of legal 
certainty,260 holding that, “the invalidity of the floor clauses in question did 
not affect situations in which final decisions had been made in judgments 
with the force of res judicata or payments made before May 9, 2013, so that 
only payments made after that date had to be repaid.”261 
In the underlying Naranjo case, the Tribunal Supremo then extended its 
ruling regarding retroactivity to individuals. Individual mortgagors who paid 
amounts in accordance with terms of their contract, later adjudicated to be 
unfair, could not recuperate all of their past payments. Instead, they were 
only entitled to reimbursement of payments made after the Tribunal 
Supremo’s decision.262 The referring courts prevailed upon the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling addressing several matters.263 At their core, they 
concerned: (i) Whether a domestic court can impose a time frame, limiting 
the effect of its ruling, after it has declared a contractual term unfair and void 
without violating the Directive’s mandate to Member States to ensure that 
consumers are not bound by unfair terms and that consumers have the full 
protection of the EU Charter264 and (ii) In making restitution for sums 
collected under a term that has been adjudicated as unfair and void, whether 
lenders have to return all the money they received in payment under the 
unfair term or can the court limit the damages.265 
 
 258.  Id. ¶ 51. 
 259.  Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
 260.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. ¶¶ 21, 25–26. On May 9, 2013, the Tribunal Supremo published a decision holding that the 
floor clauses at issue in the collective action were void due to the lenders’ inadequate disclosure of them 
during the formation of the relevant mortgage contracts. At the time, the court restricted the effect of its 
ruling to payments made after the court’s decision. The Tribunal Supremo then, in its ruling of March 25, 
2015 (Judgment No 139/2015), “extended to individual actions for redress the approach previously 
upheld in the judgment of 9 May 2013 in respect of collective actions for an injunction.” Id. ¶ 41. 
Consequently, individuals seeking recovery for the excess amounts they paid in connection with the floor 
clauses in their respective contracts were limited to the time period beginning with the March 9, 2013 
date, forward. Id. ¶ 26. 
 263.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 264.  Id. ¶ 46 (citing Articles 6 and 7 of the UCT Directive and Article 47 of the EU Charter). 
 265.  Id. ¶¶ 42, 46. 
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The ECJ’s Grand Chamber ruled that national courts may not prescribe 
their rulings in ways that fail to “restor[e] the consumer to the legal and 
factual situation that he would have been in” absent that term.266 Consumers 
have a right to restitution for all monies wrongly obtained by the supplier 
through the use of unfair terms.267 
3. Expanding the Scope of Inquiry in Kušinova 
Monika Kušinova v. SMART Capital, a.s.268 is an important bridge 
between the ECJ jurisprudence that grew out of Spain’s iterative integration 
process involving the UCT Directive, and the human rights housing cases 
decided by the UN ESCR Committee. While Kušinova differs from the 
foregoing cases in some respects,269 it is an essential part of the narrative 
documenting private law’s incorporation of human rights principles where 
the home is central to the dispute. 
Ms. Kušinova entered into a credit and charge agreement with SMART 
Capital for 10,000 euros. As security for the loan, she pledged her home.270 
Later, Kušinova sought to annul the agreements, alleging that they were 
unfair and the procedural law granting creditors certain enforcement powers 
was in violation of both directives and Article 38 of the EU Charter.271 The 
agreements and civil code permitted the creditors to possess Kušinova’s 
pledged property without court supervision.272 The domestic court273 referred 
the matter to the ECJ to resolve whether the civil code’s restraint on judicial 
review and the contractual terms of the agreements deprived Kušinova of her 
rights under the UCT Directive.274 
Leaving to Slovakia’s courts the initial determination of whether the 
national civil code was compliant with EU mandates,275 the ECJ concluded 
 
 266.  Id. ¶ 61. 
 267.  Id. ¶ 66. 
 268.  See generally Case C-34/13, Kušionová v. SMART Capital a.s., 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189 
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157486&pageIndex= 
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18304392 (providing an interpretation of the 
“Council Directive 93/13/EEC . . . on unfair terms in consumer contracts” and the “Directive 2005/29/EC 
of the European Parliament . . . concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market.”). 
 269.  See id. para. 1 (explaining that two EU Directives were at play, the UCT Directive and Directive 
2005/29/EC, concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market). 
 270.  Id. para. 25. 
 271.  See EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 38 (discussing how Article 38 requires that the EU adopt 
policies that “ensure a high level of consumer protection”). 
 272.  Kušinova, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189, para 27. 
 273.  Id. para. 26 (explaining that the referring court was the Regional Court, Prešov (Krajsky súd 
Prešov)). 
 274.  Id. paras. 27–28. 
 275.  Id. paras. 79–81. 
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that national laws, such as Slovakia’s, which allow lenders to collect debts 
without judicial supervision are not per se prohibited by the UCT 
Directive.276 While this aspect of the decision is not particularly pro-
consumer, the ECJ’s reasoning regarding the significance of the home and 
the relationship between housing contracts and EU laws is supportive of 
housing consumers and is worth quoting at length: 
The loss of a family home is not only such as to seriously undermine 
consumer rights, but it also places the family of the consumer concerned 
in a particularly vulnerable position. 
 
In that regard, the European Court of Human Rights has held, first, that 
the loss of a home is one of the most serious breaches of the right to respect 
for the home, and secondly, that any person who risks being the victim of 
such a breach should be able to have the proportionality of such a measure 
reviewed. 
 
Under EU law, the right to accommodation is a fundamental right 
guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter that the referring Court must 
take into consideration when implementing Directive 93/13. With regard 
to the particular consequences of the eviction of the consumer and his 
family from the accommodation forming their principal family home, the 
Court has already emphasized the importance, for the national court, to 
provide for interim measures by which unlawful mortgage enforcement 
proceedings may be suspended or terminated where the grant of such 
measures proves necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
protection intended by Directive 93/13.277 
There are numerous noteworthy aspects to the Kušinova decision. The 
ECJ connected the human right to housing under the EU Charter to the UCT 
Directive. The decision emphasized the privileged status accorded to the 
residential home. The Court recognized that there is a punitive nature to 
dispossession that requires careful judicial scrutiny of the dispossessing 
device. Further, the Court instructed that governments must align their 
domestic procedural rules so that individuals are able to obtain meaningful 
relief in matters pertaining to their housing tenure. Kušinova is part of the 
lineage of public law incursions into the private housing law sphere. The 
Court’s acknowledgement of the particular “vulnerability” of individuals 
under threat of eviction opens up possibilities regarding protections that are 
available notwithstanding the private nature of the transaction at issue. Given 
the express references to human rights, Kušinova offers an appropriate segue 
from private law to the jurisprudence emanating from the sphere of human 
rights on housing. 
 
 276.  Id. para. 68. 
 277.  Id. paras. 63–66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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B. ICESCR Decisions Supporting the Right to Housing 
With IDG v. Spain,278 the private law mortgage frame expands more 
decisively into the space of international human rights. The UN ESCR 
Committee purposefully linked two types of private transactions, lender-
based contracts and landlord-based rental agreements, to the public law right 
to housing.279 In transitioning to the public law human rights sphere, this 
analysis moves from the ECJ, a judicial entity authorized to interpret 
European Union Law for its constituency, to the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The Committee interprets the 
ESCR treaty for UN Members who have acceded to or ratified it.280 
1. Right to Housing as an Independent Basis for Claims in IDG 
IDG presents an opportunity to analyze how issues similar to those 
examined in Aziz (e.g., unfair mortgage terms and national civil procedures) 
have been filtered and processed through the human rights legal mechanism 
of the ESCR Committee. While Ms. IDG focused on the due process 
procedural concerns of notice, at the core of her complaint was a demand for 
an opportunity to challenge the terms and structuring of her mortgage loan 
contract.281 Ms. IDG filed a communication before the Committee on 
January 28, 2014, one year after Aziz.282 Like Aziz, IDG concerned the 
fairness of Spain’s mortgage procedures concerning borrowers. She took out 
financing to purchase her home, appraised at €742,890.68.283 After missing 
several payments, her lender accelerated the loan and commenced 
enforcement.284 The lender sought to collect €381,153.66 (principal), 
€5,725.80 (ordinary interest), and €856.77 (default interest).”285 
Enforcement included auctioning the property.286 Authorized by the 
enforcement courts, and at the lender’s request, a state agent made four 
attempts to hand-deliver notification of the auction to IDG without 
 
 278.  U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (fifty-fifth session) Concerning Communication No. 2/2014, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (June 2015) [hereinafter IDG]. 
 279.  Id. para. 12.1. 
 280.  Eighteen independent experts who are elected by State parties sit on the ESCR Committee. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
 281.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 3.4. 
 282.  Id. para. 2.16. 
 283.  Id. para. 2.1. 
 284.  Id. paras. 2.3, 10.6. 
 285.  Id. para. 2.3. 
 286.  Id. 
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success.287 The agent then posted the notice of the enforcement proceeding’s 
location on the courthouse board.288 
Relying upon ICESCR’s provisions, Ms. IDG argued that Spain’s 
mortgage enforcement procedures, especially for notice, violated her right to 
housing,289 and her right to a remedy.290 The latter provision requires States 
to accomplish, “progressively,” the “full realization”291 of the rights 
enumerated in ICESCR.292 Ms. IDG alleged that because the lender failed to 
serve her with actual notice at the two critical stages of initiating the 
enforcement proceeding and initiating the auction of her house, she was 
deprived of the opportunity to present a solid defense against the bank’s 
allegations of purported amounts she owed and regarding any unfair terms 
in her mortgage contract.293 The Committee agreed,294 noting that the right 
to housing is a “fundamental right central to the enjoyment of all economic, 
social and cultural rights[] and is inextricably linked to other human 
rights . . . .”295 Under the ICESCR, the right to housing means “the right to 
live somewhere in security, peace, and dignity.”296 For forced evictions, 
extra precautions must be taken by the government in constructing its 
procedural rules of notice and process to ensure access to judicial 
remedies.297 Corresponding to housing scholar Matthew Desmond’s 
argument that evictions are a corrosive force within American society, the 
Committee expressed disdain for the constant uprooting of individuals and 
families solely for the purpose of serving lenders, landlords, or corporate 
interests without appropriate legal safeguards and process.298 If left 
unregulated, not only do evictions threaten human dignity, they undermine 
the socio-economic stability of nations. While public posting may be a valid 
 
 287.  Id. para. 2.4. 
 288.  Id. para. 2.5. 
 289.  See ICESCR, supra note 117. 
 290.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 11.4; ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 5. 
 291.  ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 2 ¶ 1. 
 292.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 3.5. 
 293.  Id. paras. 3.3–3.5. 
 294.  Id. paras. 12.4, 13.5, 15. 
 295.  Id. para. 11.1. 
 296.  Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet 
No. 21/Rev., at 1–3 (2014); U.N., Off. of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., CESCR General Comment 
No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 4]. 
 297.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 11.2. The Committee referenced its General Comment 7 in which 
it elaborates on this point of sufficient access to judicial process and remedies. 
 298.  MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 295–99 
(2016); IDG, supra note 278, paras. 11.1–11.2, 11.4, 12.1, 12.3, 17(c); General Comment No. 4, supra 
note 296, ¶¶ 8(a), 17–18; U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Rep. on 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Sessions, annex IV, paras. 1, 3, 8, 11–16, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1998). 
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method for serving notice of housing proceedings, it should be used only as 
a “measure of last resort,” especially when dealing with evictions.299 
The Committee’s logic parallels the ECJ’s in Aziz.300 Both adjudicatory 
entities recognized that the failure to provide borrowers with a meaningful 
process, where the loss of the claimant’s home is involved, constitutes a 
violation of the international legal instrument invoked. Notwithstanding the 
advances IDG makes in connecting private law and public human rights, the 
case has significant limitations. The Committee declined to issue a broad 
ruling.301 Furthermore, the Committee did not rule upon the specific terms 
within Ms. IDG’s mortgage loan document. While the ESCR panel can make 
determinations as to whether a state’s procedural process for enforcing 
mortgage proceedings is fair and in compliance with the treaty, the question 
of whether the Committee may properly invalidate the terms of loan 
contracts based on unfairness remains unresolved. It is clear, however, that 
while the right to housing may remain the basis of the claim, the sources for 
determining fairness may not include the UCT Directive, expressly, since the 
interpretation of the Directive remains outside the competency of the 
Committee. For a ruling on the unfairness of mortgage terms, Ms. IDG will 
need to return to Spain’s courts. If she can find no proper hearing on 
substantive issues, she may appear again before the ESCR Committee. If this 
proves insufficient, she may find herself before the ECtHR or before the ECJ, 
although the basis of the claims would be different. IDG could draw upon 
the ECHR if she chooses the ECtHR as her forum. If she chooses the ECJ to 
present a claim, she may rely upon the Charter or any of the relevant EU 
regulations. 
Even in the absence of a substantive ruling on the unfairness of Ms. 
IDG’s mortgage contract terms, the case demonstrates that housing 
complainants who are participants in other juridical spaces may look across 
regimes for arguments, inspiration, and paradigms. 
 
 299.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 12.3. 
 300.  At the time of the posting, the ECJ had not yet issued its Aziz ruling. The posture of Spain’s 
procedural law, in that moment, left Ms. IDG without a forum to both contest the terms in her mortgage 
contract and suspend the enforcement proceeding, pending a decision. 
 301.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 13.5 (“Given the specificity of the problem of inadequate notice 
posed by the author, the Committee is not required, in the context of this communication, to consider 
whether or not the State party’s internal rules governing mortgage enforcement procedures and the 
possible auctioning of mortgaged properties, which may be dwellings, are generally consistent with the 
right to housing.”). 
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2. Obligations of the State in MBD v. Spain 
In MBD v. Spain,302 the International Committee reimagines the 
boundaries between the public and private law spheres. The Committee 
develops a policy view on forced evictions and housing-related rights that 
may be adjudicated by courts. MBD not only concerns private leasing 
arrangements and the right to housing, it implicates the State.303 In MBD, Mr. 
Djazia and Ms. Bellili resided in a rented apartment in Madrid, paying their 
rent to a private landlord without significant incident for several years until 
they encountered financial difficulties. Without sufficient income to 
continue their rental payments, they were evicted and left homeless.304 
Shortly after their landlord moved to evict them, they filed suit before the 
Committee, drawing on provisions in the ICESCR.305 The laws governing 
the eviction process did not allow tenants to challenge the substantive basis 
of the rental contract or the landlord’s enforcement. They only permitted 
tenants to raise the defense that the deficient rent payments were actually 
paid. Djazia and Bellili alleged that this procedure was faulty in that it denied 
renter due process.306 They further alleged that Spain violated their right to 
“decent and adequate housing” in ignoring their repeated requests to be 
relocated to public rental housing and for subsistence payments.307 The 
Committee agreed.308 
Recognizing that the ICESCR grants broad rights and protections to 
individuals, the Committee concluded that the guarantees associated with the 
right to housing extend “to persons living in rental accommodation, whether 
public or private” and that “such persons should enjoy the right to housing 
even when the lease expires.”309 Notwithstanding that the State was not the 
primary instigator behind the eviction, the Committee reasoned that 
 
 302.  MBD, supra note 57. The ESCR Committee adopted its views on the case on June 20, 2017. 
Id. paras. 18–22. 
 303.  The State alleged that the complaint did not fall within the purview of Article 11. Id. para. 12.7. 
The ESCR Committee concluded: “although the Covenant primarily establishes rights and obligations 
between the State and individuals, the scope of the provisions of the Covenant extends to relations 
between individuals. An eviction related to a rental contract between individuals can, therefore, involve 
Covenant rights.” Id. para. 14.2. 
 304.  Id. paras. 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 2.19. 
 305.  Id. paras. 1.1, 4.1. The complainants filed suit under Article 11(1) and Article I(e) and (f) and 
Article 4. Id. 
 306.  Id. para. 16.4. 
 307.  Id. paras. 2.11, 3.1. 
 308.  Id. paras. 13.1–13.3, 20. Here, again, although the Committee does not expressly reference Aziz, 
the logic of Aziz is apparent from the emphasis on the denial of equitable legal procedures to housing 
consumers. See id. para. 16.4 (noting that the legislation does not provide defendants in juridical eviction 
proceedings the opportunity to explain the consequences of the eviction). Cf. Case C-415/11, Aziz v. 
Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 61 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
 309.  MBD, supra note 57, para. 13.2. 
BARNES_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
2020] REFRAMING HOUSING 137 
individuals who lease from private landlords should be able to draw upon 
international legal buffers to prevent forced eviction.310 The private nature of 
a landlord-tenant transaction does not negate the State’s responsibilities to 
ensure that  individual human rights are respected in the enforcement of the 
contract.311 Because the State “bears the ultimate responsibility,”312 it must 
ensure that the right to housing is not transgressed in the administration or 
outcome of the eviction, and must devise laws to achieve this end.313 Being 
duty bound means that when individuals are facing impending eviction and 
they have requested government assistance, the parties must not be left 
homeless.314 Forced evictions are “prima facie incompatible with the 
requirements of the Covenant and can be justified only in the most 
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international law.”315 This is remarkable.316 If Spain is held to this standard, 
it must substantially expand its social housing network. There are limits, 
however, to the intervention of public law in private transactions. The right 
to housing does not preclude landlords from evicting tenants. Instead, it 
restricts the manner in which landlords may do so. Tenant evictions are 
permissible, provided they are carried out as a “last resort and that the 
persons concerned have had prior access to an effective judicial remedy” to 
scrutinize the merits of the eviction action.317 
The MBD ruling permits States to intrude in the individual private 
ordering of housing contracts. There is a rational link to the functioning of 
housing markets. Homelessness strains municipal resources and gives rise to 
 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. para. 14.1. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. paras. 14.1–14.2. Particularly, where minor children are involved, as was the circumstance 
in MBD, the State has a heightened duty to prevent homelessness. See id. paras. 15.2, 16.6 (clarifying that 
the State has a greater duty to justify why it was unable to uphold the right to housing when children are 
involved). 
 314.  IDG, supra note 278, paras. 6.1–6.5. 
 315.  Id. para. 11.1. 
 316.  The ESCR Committee ruling advances an important “precedent” in human rights literature. I 
am referring to Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom. Despite the progressive nature 
of South Africa’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court interpreted the right to housing in a constrained 
way. It held that the constitutional right to housing, contained in Section 26, is circumscribed by the 
availability of resources. Neither the government’s failures nor the dire circumstances of homelessness 
entitled the claimants to rely upon the self-help remedy of squatting. On the positive side, the Court held 
that the State was in violation of the housing right because of the manner in which it evicted squatter-
complainants. The Court also weighed in on a longstanding debate concerning whether socio-economic 
rights are aspirational or concrete. The Court concluded that the Constitution confers real rights that the 
State has an obligation to realize and protect. See Government of The Republic of South Africa v. 
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 317.  MBD, supra note 57, para. 15.1. 
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health, safety, and welfare issues.318 A substantial homeless presence raises 
questions about the socio-economic agendas of municipalities and their 
ability to serve their populaces fairly and equitably. From a social justice 
perspective, this is not a problem that is solved by merely cordoning off the 
displaced. This explains the UN Committee’s human rights approach of 
holding the government liable319 because governments can act in impactful 
ways to lessen the frequency of evictions leading to homelessness. 
Governments can design laws, ordinances, and model landlord-tenant 
contracts that more evenly balance the protections accorded to each party.320 
One can read the MBD decision as incentivizing governments in this 
direction.321 The ruling also speaks to those in the law and economics camp 
by implicitly recognizing that if a significant portion of a nation’s market 
participants are harmed by laws that prevent them from acting as consumers, 
there is a market failure that needs to be addressed. Where unfettered markets 
are unable to perform the task, regulations are needed. 
The MBD decision illustrates how supranational adjudicatory organs 
can facilitate the realization of human rights principles. Spain’s Constitution, 
for example, contains a mandate that government should deter excessive land 
speculation, because such speculation ultimately harms individuals and 
strains government resources.322 Individuals either end up paying higher 
rents because of land speculation or are priced out of the market entirely. In 
those instances, they will seek public assistance to help cover their housing 
costs. Yet Spain, prior to and during the 2008 economic crisis, contributed 
to rampant speculation, which exacerbated the nation’s housing issues. In 
2013, the Madrid Housing Institute “sold 2,935 [public] homes to private 
 
 318.  Potentially, a homeless person could bring a claim against the government for failing to provide 
public housing or, at a minimum, for failing to provide a bed in a public shelter. 
 319.  The ESCR Committee determined that Spain violated the right to housing and that, as a remedy, 
the complainants should be given public housing and paid compensatory damages related to the violation 
and for reasonable legal costs related to bringing the action before the Committee. Id. para. 20. 
 320.  As the Committee proposed, States may use any combination of subsidies and laws to meet 
their obligations, but “any measures adopted must be deliberate, specific and as straightforward as 
possible to fulfill [the] right as swiftly and efficiently as possible.” Id. para. 15.3. 
 321.  The ESCR Committee goes even further in Albán v. Spain, 2019, by elaborating on the 
extensive duties of the government to: “take all appropriate measures to the maximum of its available 
resources, to ensure that adequate alternate housing, resettlement, or access to public land, as the case 
may be, is available[], and “resolve . . . structural problems” related to homelessness. See U.N., Econ. & 
Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc. and Cultural Rts., Views Adopted by the Committee Under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concerning 
Communication No. 37/2018, paras. 9.1, 10.2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/66/D/37/2018 (2019). 
 322.  See C.E., supra note 82, art. 47 (“The public authorities shall promote the necessary conditions 
and shall establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, regulating land use in 
accordance with the general interest in order to prevent speculation.”). 
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companies/investment funds”323 for 201 million euros.324 Madrid brokered 
this deal at a time when its public housing inventory had already been 
seriously depleted. The government’s explanation for privatizing desperately 
needed public housing was that it was necessary to address budgetary 
deficits.325 Heavily criticizing Spain’s actions, the ESCR Committee advised 
that, “[i]n severe economic and financial crisis, all budgetary changes or 
adjustments, affecting policies must be temporary, necessary, proportional 
and non-discriminatory. . . .”326 Privatizing social housing, effectively 
removing it from the public commons327 contributes to the “structural causes 
of the lack of housing”328 rather than remedying them. The ESCR Committee 
urged the government to be more proactive on the side of drafting legislation 
aimed at protecting tenants and those in need of housing, and to refrain from 
engaging with developers in a manner that fosters reckless unbounded 
speculation rather than deterring it. 
C. Cases and the New Rules for the Mortgage, Rental Housing, and 
Subsidized Housing Markets 
The cases examined in this section carve out new rules in the mortgage, 
rental housing, and subsidized housing markets. At the national level, the 
majority of the claims were styled as attacks on the unfairness of the 
mortgage loan or rental contract terms. At the supranational level, many 
claims were transformed into ones concerning the unfairness of domestic 
legal procedures. With respect to procedure, the cases articulate guidelines 
and rules about timing, notice, dispossession, and equality in due process and 
appeals. The meaning of unfairness in housing contractual relations is 
developed in judicial discourse. Rhetorically, the home is given sacrosanct 
status. As the ECJ concluded, “[where] the mortgaged property is the family 
home of the consumer whose rights have been infringed [upon],” appropriate 
measures must be in place “to prevent the definitive and irreversible loss of 
 
 323.  MBD, supra note 57, para. 12.4. 
 324.  Id. paras. 5.5, 12.4. 
 325.  Public interest may be defined in several ways. According to one view, the public interest is 
served by having the debts of the country reduced so that, the government has money in the future to 
expend on resources to benefit the public in matters such as housing, education, and infrastructure. 
Another perspective defines the public interest as, preserving land already dedicated to public housing 
for that use and finding alternative ways of raising capital to pay down public debt. In this instance, the 
ESCR Committee embraced the latter view in holding that the government failed to adequately value the 
need for affordable and subsidized housing. 
 326.  Id. para. 17.6. 
 327.  The “public commons” refers to the collective resources designated for the public good and 
placed in the care of government for that purpose. 
 328.  Id. para. 15.3. 
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that dwelling” without a proper hearing.329 Note that the homeowner can still 
be dispossessed, but, prior to doing so, legitimate justifications must be 
furnished in accordance with a legally-sanctioned procedure. The ECJ 
decisions lay a foundation to intersect with the right to housing. The ESCR 
Committee’s rulings, in part because they are framed as cases against the 
sovereign state, impose obligations on the government. Nonetheless, they 
implicate private actors because the government will need to craft laws and 
regulations pertaining to housing transactions. The reframing on both fronts 
pushes the private sphere of residential mortgage debt financing and rental 
contracts towards the public sphere of the human right to housing. The ECJ’s 
engagement by way of directives and the EU Charter is also a reminder of 
the broader economic market. The costs exacted by unduly oppressive 
private housing contracts and legal rules primarily structured to engender 
profit-making at the expense of basic human interests have implications that 
exceed domestic boundaries. The EU’s project of the integrated economic 
market is undermined by market failure, which is evidenced by rampant 
homelessness, poverty, over-indebtedness, and the widespread inability to 
meet debt obligations on the part of individuals and government.330 
Supranational courts provide forums in which the market interests of 
stability, participation, efficiency, and coordination may intermingle with the 
welfarist ideal of human flourishing. 
The concepts of vulnerability and human dignity are also integral to this 
changing paradigm narrative. Vulnerability has emerged as a term of 
 
 329.  See Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶ 61 
(Mar. 14, 2013). 
 330.  Achieving consistency, translatability, and harmonization across markets are among the 
paramount objectives of the EU Council. See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach 
to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339 (1997) (discussing translatability in connection with 
the Common Core Project and distinguishing between the Project and harmonization). Jan M. Smits, The 
Principles of European Contract Law and the Harmonization of Private Law in Europe, in LA TERCERA 
PARTE DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL EUROPEO, 567–90 (Antoni Vacquer ed., 2005); 
Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence and Varieties of Capitalism 
(ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 355/2017, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2977500. 
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currency in international law.331 Cognizance of levels of vulnerability332 
along gender lines, family,333 age, disability, and immigrant status334 is 
apparent in the ECJ and the ESCR Committee decisions.335 Vulnerability’s 
influence is reflected in the use of the term “weaker party” in both the private 
and public law realms. Vulnerability may be defined in several ways. 
Vulnerability refers to the existential condition, positioning, or status of the 
individual that renders the person susceptible to tactics, practices, and 
structures of institutions or others, causing detriment. The condition or status 
of the person suggests that the individual is not functioning as an arms-length 
bargainer. Rather, he or she is impaired in the ability to interact freely with 
government, corporations, or other individuals. Individual autonomy is 
compromised or nonexistent.336 Under the freedom of contract narrative, 
individual private actors are framed as rational self-interested human beings 
 
 331.  Gutiérrez de Cabiedes & Cantero Gamito, supra note 24, at 69. See, e.g., UNCONSCIONABILITY 
IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny et al. 
eds., 2010). Spain’s government uses the term “vulnerability” in two key national laws, Royal Decree-
Law 6/2012 and Royal Decree-Law 27/2012, adopted prior to the Aziz decision. The rapporteurs for the 
Country Report on Spain propose that, in the absence of express language defining this concept, one can 
nonetheless discern a sense of the meaning from the laws which suggest that aspects of vulnerability 
include low income, poverty, lack of assets that may be dedicated to paying the mortgage obligation, 
families under impending threat of foreclosure and eviction, and families with disabled members. 
 332.  See MBD, supra note 57, para 15.2 (“[P]ay particular attention to evictions that involve women, 
children, older persons with disabilities or other vulnerable individuals or groups who are subjected to 
systemic discrimination.”). 
 333.  See id. para. 17.7 (underscoring that it is “the State’s duty to grant the greatest and widest 
possible protection to the family, as the foundation of society”). 
 334.  Kothari, supra note 31. A substantial portion of the immigrant community has been impacted 
negatively by bank foreclosures. See García-Lamarca, supra note 11, at 44, 47. 
 335.  The Aziz case involved an individual of Moroccan heritage, whose employment in Spain 
commenced in December 1993. The case does not deal with ethnic discrimination; however, given the 
history of discrimination in Spain against Africans and Muslims and his status as a minority, Mr. Aziz’s 
ethnic background raises a question as to whether his heritage (and possibly his religion) factored into his 
experience with Caixa. His story, combined with those of others explored in this paper, invites scrutiny 
regarding the vulnerability of minority groups with respect to the predatory lending practices of banks. 
While all groups without access to meaningful capital and influence suffer from the power differential 
that exists between banks and the general public, there are certain groups that banks may more readily 
target for burdensome and “unscrupulous” lending processes. Some troublesome actions include: 
inadequate underwriting that approves individuals without adequate assets for loans, precluding 
refinancing, precluding loan modifications, offering predatory mortgage loan types (e.g. adjustable rate 
mortgages with “usurious” interest rates, and over-securitizing loans by requiring guarantors on 
residential loans that the bank ordinarily would not insist upon, thereby exposing more than one property 
owner to the risk of losing assets in the event of a default. 
 336.  See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133, 
133–49 (2017) (arguing that we are all vulnerable). It is important to note, however, that we are not all 
equally vulnerable. For example, a study by Human Rights Watch identifies immigrants, single-mothers, 
“single-parent households . . . women victims of economic abuse, and children” as being the most 
vulnerable and as having suffered “disproportionate” harm related to Spain’s housing crisis. See 
SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 29. 
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who should be left to their own resourcefulness to formulate contracts and 
autonomously determine the contours of their existence in society. 
Vulnerability theory offers an alternative to the private law autonomous 
individual vision. Martha Fineman, one of the leading scholars in this area, 
posits: 
. . . [T]he institutions of particular interest are those that are created and 
maintained under the legitimating authority of the state, since the ultimate 
objective of vulnerability analysis is to argue that the state must be more 
responsive to, and responsible for vulnerability.337 
Although the ECJ does not always expressly use the term “vulnerable,” 
it draws upon the logic of vulnerability theory in recognizing inequities in 
the status and bargaining power of banks and mortgage consumers. Instead 
of “vulnerable,” the ECJ refers to mortgage consumers as weaker parties.338 
The analysis of whether the mortgage terms are unfair is framed in terms of: 
(i) whether a reasonable person would have accepted the contract; (ii) 
whether the consumer had any flexibility with respect to the non-negotiated 
terms; and (iii) whether the contract terms were written in intelligible 
language.339 Translated into the lexicon of vulnerability, one would inquire 
about the effect of the contractual terms and the mortgage process on 
borrowers who may be vulnerable because of their experience or economic 
circumstances.340 The ESCR Committee uses the term “vulnerable” in 
matters concerning residential mortgage loans and rental housing.341 
Vulnerability, in this context, involves being “subjected to systemic 
discrimination.”342 Systemic discrimination indicates that the government is 
unresponsive to the plight of individuals who are in need of services, 
resources, and protective mechanisms in order to live in dignity. 
Complainant IDG characterized herself as being in a position of 
“vulnerability, uncertainty, and anxiety” as a result of her financial 
institution availing itself of national procedural rules that favored lenders.343 
 
 337.  Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2008). I draw a distinction between Fineman’s theory and 
my own in that I recognize that the world is not in a post-identity moment and the utility of strategically 
claiming identity-positions has not been exhausted, particularly when individuals are routinely identified, 
engaged, and penalized. 
 338.  Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 & C-308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, 2016 
EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62015CJ0154, ¶ 56 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
 339.  Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415, ¶¶ 3–4, 69 
(Mar. 14, 2013). 
 340.  For example, potential borrowers may be in need of capital, but their credit rating impairs their 
ability to bargain over loan contract terms. 
 341.  MBD, supra note 57, para. 21(c). 
 342.  Id. para. 15.2. 
 343.  IDG, supra note 278, para. 10.2. 
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In MBD, the UN Committee directs states to “ensure that evicted persons 
have alternative housing, especially in cases involving families, older 
persons, children and/or other persons in vulnerable situations.”344 Usage of 
the term “vulnerability” is a nod towards representing the particular 
experiential aspects of a person’s existence which render him susceptible to 
harm from the blanket application of private adhesion contracts or public 
policies weighted in favor of businesses. It reflects a human rights 
sensibility. Human rights law allows for broader inquiry than the question of 
whether a contract is unconscionable. 
The foregoing discussion analyzes how the reframing of housing 
markets has unfolded. It explores the emergence of a paradigmatic shift from 
siloed private and public law regimes to one incorporating both. It also 
highlights some of the positive attributes of the new approach. In the section 
that follows, I intervene in the central debate between public and private law 
scholars regarding the intermingling of these two legal terrains. 
VI.  DEBATING THE TERRAINS OF PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE 
LAW 
A. The Public-Private Law Debate 
There is an emerging scholarly debate regarding the extent to which 
public law principles should be enfolded into private law.345 European 
private law stalwarts express numerous concerns aimed at maintaining 
doctrinal boundaries. Public law advocates focus on the historical shortfalls 
of European Union law in not giving sufficient prominence to social justice 
objectives. Another approach—which this Article advocates—is a way of 
conceptualizing what is occurring and what is necessary to accomplish 
essential objectives of both camps. 
Progress towards a rethinking of private and public law in the European 
context has been fraught with difficulty.346 A vocal contingent, of dominant 
market actors (e.g., banks, real estate entities, landlords, government) and 
private law scholars, have greeted the softening of boundaries between 
private and public law with apprehension.347 First, the critics maintain that 
 
 344.  MBD, supra note 57, para. 21(c). 
 345.  See, e.g., Hugh Collins, Private Law, Fundamental Rights, and the Rule of Law, 121 W. VA. L. 
REV. 1 (2018); Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The Call 
for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 346.  Taking into account the move towards the “constitutionalization of private law” in the United 
States and foreign jurisdictions, Hugh Collins analyzes and counters several main arguments against the 
intermixing of private and public law. See Collins, supra note 345, at 12–20. 
 347.  See id. (articulating a critical treatment of the central arguments); see also Michel Rosenfeld, 
Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First Century: An 
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the juridical-legislative move threatens freedom of contract.348 They argue 
that parties should be left to engage in the evaluative process of assessing 
risk, bargaining, and the structuring of their own deals as they see fit.  
International courts and conventions add new risks. Privately negotiated 
contracts will be remade in a way that the parties didn’t contemplate. The 
blending of public and private is, initially, likely to weigh more heavily 
against corporate actors. Rather than achieving more equality in the market, 
substantial incursions into private contracting will seriously debilitate 
businesses, which will ultimately hurt the economy and individuals, from a 
trickle-down perspective. Higher transaction costs will be passed on to 
consumers. Access to credit will be decreased because either lenders will 
conclude that their estimated profit margin on certain loans will be 
insufficient or consumers will decide that the loans are cost prohibitive. 
Second, staunch private law supporters have lamented that incorporating 
public law principles undermines private law’s ability to resolve issues 
concerning housing contracts.349 They argue that the blurring of regimes 
creates confusion and deprives actors from shaping the rules, laws, and 
practices that govern transactions. Excessive mixing of the terrains of private 
and public law dilutes carefully developed private law principles.350 Private 
law furnishes the expertise and detail necessary to manage the intricacies of 
the various deals at issue. When the overlay of international human rights 
ideals is added, it threatens the carefully worked out rules and the individual 
freedom to assess risk and formulate contracts. Olha Cherednychenko, along 
 
Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–28 (2013) (discussing the traditional divide between public 
law and private law). 
 348.  See Jürgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a 
Hybrid, 9 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 35 (2001); Mattei & Nicola, supra note 345, at 17 (discussing Jürgen 
Baseow’s arguments expressed in his article, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The 
Making of a Hybrid regarding the relevance of freedom of contact and its importance to the anchoring of 
the EU). 
 349.  Recent literature has noted the intersection between private corporate behavior and public 
human rights. Olha Cherednychenko comments: 
[I]n German law in particular, there has been a noticeable change in the extent to which 
fundamental rights, i.e. human rights embodied in international human rights treaties and 
constitutional rights enshrined in national constitutions, have begun to have an impact on the 
relationships between private parties under contract law, i.e. a horizontal effect in contract law. 
Olha O. Cherednychenko, Conceptualising Unconscionability in the Context of Risky Financial 
Transactions: How to Converge Public and Private Law Approaches?, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, supra note 331, at 247. See Michel Rosenfeld, 
Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First Century: An 
Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–28 (2013) (noting the existence of the debate). 
 350.  See generally Cherednychenko, supra note 349 (analyzing the interplay of public and private 
law in the context of unconscionability in financial transactions). 
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with other private law scholars, argues that private law is enough.351 She 
maintains that by resorting to a combination of private law norms and 
European private law regulatory business conduct rules,352 enacted at the 
supranational level,353 sufficient protection for consumers can be achieved 
without diminishing the authority of the private law regime.354 Third, the 
skeptics argue that what is offered in place of contract law’s clearly defined 
rules and doctrines are muddied and ill-defined ad hoc approaches that lead 
to uncertainty and inconsistency in judicial outcomes.355 
On the other side of the debate are public law advocates who champion 
the relevance of human rights to all sectors of life, including private 
ordering.356 Legal professionals, such as judges and experts on the ECtHR 
or the ESCR Committee, are included within this group. They recognize the 
values expressed in the international instruments they are responsible for 
interpreting and are committed to the ideal of human rights. There are also 
advocates who work in organizations dedicated to advancing human rights 
and human rights scholars within the academy. Their arguments fall along a 
spectrum. Some recognize that given the human rights international 
conventions in place,357 adherence is required in order to be in compliance 
 
 351.  According to Cherednychenko, German contract law contains within it “general legal concepts 
such as good faith, good morals or public policy, defects of consent” that could operate to address 
inequalities in contractual agreements that ultimately harm the weaker party. Id. at 258–59. 
 352.  See, e.g., Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011); Eur. Ass’n of Consumers and the Eur. Credit Sector 
Ass’ns [ECSAs], European Agreement on a Voluntary code of Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information 
on Home Loans, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/051-private-act.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2021). 
 353.  Examples of supranational business conduct rules include: Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive and the Investment Services Directive. See Cherednychenko, supra note 349, at 262–74. 
 354.  Cherednychenko observes that because private law has developed important standards and 
practices over time, “[f]undamental rights . . . do not add anything substantially new to possible ways of 
resolving  . . . [how to achieve the proper balance between freedom of contract and protecting the weaker 
party], and also do not provide any workable criteria for providing new answers.” Id. at 259. She 
recognizes that while “fundamental rights are an important source of core values for the whole legal order; 
contract law as the source of concepts provid[es] much sharper criteria developed by trial and error over 
a long period of time for determining whether a particular contract is unconscionable.” Id. at 260. 
 355.  For an analysis of the differing paths of development of the international human rights regime 
and international private law, see Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law 
Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 247–50 (2015). Dubinsky argues that the 
international human rights regime was late to directly engage projects of international private law, which 
has exacerbated their incongruence and has created issues concerning bringing the two regimes together. 
See Mattei & Nicola, supra note 348, at 17 (discussing Baseow’s emphasis on the relevance of freedom 
of contact and its importance to the anchoring of the EU). 
 356.  Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 269, 269 
(2014). 
 357.  E.g., EU Charter, supra note 81, arts. 1–54; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec 
BARNES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2021  6:34 AM 
146 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:91 
with treaty obligations. Depending upon the overall objectives of the legal 
regime, human rights principles are necessary to fulfill those goals.358 Still 
other scholars have made a pitch for adopting vulnerability as a normative 
standard in the arena of consumer law359 in contrast to a purely freedom of 
contract model. There are scholars who have pushed the envelope in 
exploring whether European private law can truly implement a “progressive 
agenda” more responsive to social needs.360 Ugo Mattei and Fernanda 
Nicola, for example, have argued that social justice goals are muted when 
European Union rules and regulations are constructed solely to serve the 
economic market.361 One way of guarding against this narrow conception of 
European private law is to be cognizant of the role of ideology and politics.362 
Although this Article does not explicitly take up the critique of Mattei and 
Nicola, their position is an important one to bear in mind if one seeks to hold 
law accountable to humanity’s needs. 
1. Private Law Housing Markets Should Not be Left to Self-
Regulation 
This subsection develops the argument that the private sector cannot be 
trusted to self-regulate. Adopting a purely private law framework to resolve 
the underlying issues in Aziz, Naranjo, Hidalgo, Morcillo, Kušinova, IDG, 
and MBD, for example, leaves aspects of the claims presented 
unaddressed.363 State regulation is needed when the objectives include 
 
16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 358.  Ondersma, supra note 356. 
 359.  Irina Domurath, The Case for Vulnerability as the Normative Standard in European Consumer 
Credit and Mortgage Law—An Inquiry into the Paradigms of Consumer Law, 3 J. EUR. CONSUMER & 
MKT. L. 124 (2013). See generally Cherednychenko, supra note 349 (stressing the importance that private 
law develop concepts for protecting the vulnerable against unconscionable financial transactions). 
 360.  Mattei & Nicola, supra note 345. 
 361.  Mattei and Nicola are skeptical of the possibility of transforming European Law to implement 
a truly radical progressive agenda. They argue: 
While the targets are the Members States’ legal systems, with their incremental development 
of institutional systems of ‘social’ private law (protective formalism, mandatory law, notarized 
acts, and measures of contractual justice such as the broad use of ‘unconscionability’ or ‘good 
faith’), the means are the creation of another industry, the so-called ‘new’ European private 
law. Because the transformation of scholarly movements into industries precludes critical 
thinking, the consequence of this move is the incapacity to set an independent agenda and the 
desire to follow that of corporate-captured Brussels, in the hope of obtaining funding and 
prestige. 
Id. at 30. 
 362.  Id. at 4. 
 363.  For discussions on potential gaps in consumer protection when the private law regime is 
charged with the role of handling matters such as residential mortgage loans, Chrystin Ondersma’s work 
is insightful. She advocates fully embracing human rights principles to enrich private law concepts and 
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protecting individuals in their claims to maintain property ownership, 
stabilizing their tenure as tenants, or securing a hearing on the fairness of 
their contractual terms. Beginning with the arguments of European private 
law scholars, this section notes that the arguments are well-taken, but do not 
persuasively establish that public law principles should be partitioned off 
from the conceptualization and administration of private law matters. 
The work of scholars, practitioners, the judiciary, and private 
businesses in defining private law mechanisms to resolve disputes and 
establish remedies means that there are nuanced approaches to contractual 
issues. There are well-settled understandings of terms and concepts that one 
should not undo by an unthoughtful resort to public human rights law in the 
effort to provide relief to consumers. Yet for all the sophistication and detail 
that define the private law sphere, there are gaps. It is unlikely that the 
stronger parties in private law transactions are inclined to develop efficacious 
mechanisms to protect vulnerable parties. Thus, in response to the freedom 
of contract argument, one must query how much freedom individuals 
typically have in their interactions with corporate or government entities 
when attempting to secure the basic human staple of housing. Freedom of 
contract should not translate into the freedom of a powerful party to take 
advantage of a vulnerable party. In the absence of sufficient protection, the 
balance is too far weighted in favor of businesses to the repeated detriment 
of consumers. Without the imposition of external restraints (e.g., human 
rights obligations, supranational courts), incentives, and obligations, even 
rationally acting businesses may be shortsighted in assessing their interests 
and may not operate in a way that contributes to healthy economies overall 
within the EU. Private law interests, or even state-defined economic 
interests, are not always in sync with international human rights concerns. 
That disjuncture may dissuade dominant private actors from incorporating 
human rights considerations into their transactions. In contrast to public 
human rights, lender and landlord private actors will operate in their interests 
even if those actions are pernicious to other contractual parties. 
2. Public Law Adds Value and Positively Impacts the Housing 
Markets That Private Law Operates by Stabilizing Outcomes and Clarifying 
Objectives 
In addressing the concern that public law dilutes private law and creates 
legal uncertainty, it is necessary to consider: (i) the manner in which 
concepts such as unconscionability and good faith operate in European 
 
improve the resolution of private law matters from the standpoint of consumer protection. Chrystin D. 
Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L. REV. 373, 391 (2015); see also, 
Ondersma, supra note 356. 
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housing markets and (ii) how supranational courts and legal instruments 
have incorporated human rights principles. Although there have been some 
challenges to addressing inequalities in housing contracts, the worst fears of 
private law scholars are unfounded. The UCT Directive formalizes a vision 
of consumer transactions in which there are power imbalances between seller 
(the stronger party) and consumer (the weaker party), and in which necessary 
external mechanisms (e.g., the courts, regulating bodies, legislation) exist to 
correct the imbalances and infuse equity into the transaction. Within the 
European Union, there has long been consensus that some protection of 
consumers is warranted.364 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz comment: 
The view that general terms of business must be controlled in 
order to protect the weak and uninitiated against those with practiced 
power has proved enormously effective in discussions of legal policy. 
This slogan was embraced by the modern consumer movement and 
since the beginning of the 1960s the laws enacted by most European 
countries have been more or less based on the view that the consumer 
as the ‘weaker’ party must be protected against contractual terms 
which entrepreneurs force on him by abusing their economic 
superiority.365 
Private contract law has doctrinal principles that are intended to offer 
protection to parties under certain circumstances. Mistake, fraud, deceit, 
duress, impossibility, frustration of purpose, illegality, undue influence, and 
unconscionability are all concepts that may be drawn upon to provide relief. 
In exploring the protection that unconscionability lends, it is necessary to 
consider its scope, its purpose, and whether it accomplishes normatively 
what this Article proposes. In other words, does unconscionability furnish 
sufficient protection and support for housing consumers? Does the concept 
adequately restrain residential lenders and landlords in their contracts with 
consumers?366 Does the concept offer any protections for the homeless or 
those experiencing housing insecurity? Unconscionability is a viable, but 
incompletely formed doctrine.367 European legal scholars have documented 
 
 364.  KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, The Function and Aims of Comparative Law, in FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT AND ITS LIMITS 330 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Jacob Hale Russell offers compelling arguments which maintain that unconscionability is 
expansive enough to provide such protection in the U.S. context. Hale specifically notes the direct 
influence of the doctrine on the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act. Jacob Hale 
Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 983–84 (2019). 
 367.  This is true in Europe and the United States. In the United States, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which applies to commercial transactions, incorporates the doctrines of unconscionability and good 
faith. See U.C.C. §§ 1-304 (good faith), 2-302 (unconscionability) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1951). For a development of the discussion of these concepts in connection with the U.C.C., 
see Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug 
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that unconscionability continues to operate in different legal circumstances 
and jurisdictions.368 However, there is no singular definitive test to mark 
unconscionability, although consumer directives like the UCT provide 
guidance. The actions or inactions of contractual parties may produce an 
unconscionable contract. As discussed below, a court may determine that a 
contract is unconscionable because good faith was lacking in its formation. 
This determination may involve a test that is construed differently or 
inconsistently across jurisdictions. 
 
of War Continues, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 647 (2009); see also, Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of 
Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the Poor,’ 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014). Courts have interpreted section 
2-302 of the U.C.C. as pertaining to all types of contracts including those of mortgage loans. Kathleen C. 
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (scoping out the terrain of approaches for addressing predatory lending in the 
U.S., evaluating them, and highlighting remaining gaps in the regulatory framework); see also, Richard 
Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970). 
An obvious omission from the U.C.C. provisions is a definition of “unconscionability.” Thus, even 
though a United States court may act upon it when it decides unconscionability is present, there is no 
guided process in the U.C.C. for making the determination. Instead, the section permits parties to present 
evidence of unconscionability. Section 208 of the Restatement of Contracts also addresses 
unconscionability and states, “[i]f a contract or a term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract 
is made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract or may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term.” Further, Section 5 of the proposed new Restatement on Consumer Contracts 
offers, “a term is unconscionable if it is (1) substantively unconscionable, namely fundamentally unfair 
or unreasonably one-sided, and (2) procedurally unconscionable . . . .” The detail of when a party 
transgresses those definitions is left to the courts, but the proposed Restatement requires a party to 
demonstrate substantive and procedural unconscionability, which is a demanding burden to meet. Two 
notable American cases that wrestle with defining unconscionability are Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 
N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008). Notwithstanding the absence of a definition, the significance of the doctrine 
being codified in the U.C.C. should not be overlooked. Borrowers and other consumers in the United 
States continue to draw upon the unconscionability defense, with mixed success, in seeking relief and 
protection from burdensome and predatory contracts and practices. See, e.g., McFarland v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, 810 F.3d 273, 284–86 (4th Cir. 2016) (awarding summary judgment to the bank and holding that 
plaintiff’s claim that his contract was unconscionable when entered could not succeed even accepting his 
allegations regarding the bargaining process as true and remanding on the unconscionable inducement 
claim). But see New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014) 
(“Installment loans bearing interest rates of 1,147.14% to 1,500.00% are substantively unconscionable 
under common law and the UPA [Unfair Practices Act].”). Legal scholar Jacob Hale Russell provides 
persuasive evidence that following the global economic crisis of 2008, consumer’s claims of substantive 
unconscionability have been more successful than in prior years. Russell, supra note 366, at 1018. 
 368.  Mel Kenny et al., Conceptualising Unconscionability in Europe: In the Kaleidoscope of Private 
and Public Law, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: 
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE, supra note 331, at 377–99. American law scholars, such as Anne 
Fleming and Jacob Hale Russell, separately, have argued that the doctrine of unconscionability continues 
to be applied in different ways, including in codified forms such as the U.C.C., consumer legislation 
enacted by Congress and state legislatures, and in state court decisions. Fleming, supra note 367, at 1388, 
1391, 1436; Russell, supra note 366, at 977–78. 
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Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine, deriving from the common 
law, that may intervene to restrict the enforcement of a private contract.369 
The potential of unconscionability is tempered by freedom of contract 
norms.370 European and American courts rely upon the doctrine to address 
contractual inequality.371 In the European context, unconscionability is a 
legal invention that operates in conjunction with the international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.372 The principle mandates that “agreements 
which are legally binding must be performed.”373 Unconscionability allows 
for the possibility that a contract may be nullified or modified where there 
are contractual formation or substantive term issues. Without the 
unconscionability doctrine, private parties would be left to their own devices 
in structuring agreements. There would be no restrictions on the enforcement 
of the agreements formed, even if they had extremely harsh consequences 
for the consumer, as long as they were lawful. 
Unconscionability, unfairness, and good faith are interrelated concepts 
that inform the UCT Directive and the ECJ cases analyzed herein. While the 
ECJ does not expressly use the term “unconscionability,” its influence is 
apparent. Good faith, fairness, and unfairness are expressly referenced in the 
Directive.374 All bear on the matter of unconscionability. The 93/13 Directive 
defines “unfairness” primarily by furnishing an inchoate list of unfair terms 
and scenarios under which unfairness arises. Integral to the assessment of a 
 
 369.  Immaculada Barral-Viñais, Freedom of Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer 
Law on Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 331, at 46. 
 370.  Freedom of contract is predicated on the idea that individuals are autonomous rational beings. 
See, e.g., THOMAS GUTMANN, THEORIES OF CONTRACT AND THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY (2013); 
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper, 
Paper No. 14-598, 2018); Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law 
(Theory), 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2013). 
 371.  Camilo A. Rodriguez-Yong, The Doctrines of Unconscionability and Abusive Clauses: A 
Common Point Between Civil and Common Law Legal Traditions, OXFORD U COMP. L. F. 1, 5 (2011); 
Fleming, supra note 367; Russell, supra note 366. To be clear, I argue that the concept of 
unconscionability is operative in European and American law; however, the doctrine may be expressed 
differently depending upon the context. For example, European courts may refer to “unfairness” or “the 
doctrine of abusive clauses.” Regardless of the name, these concepts have the common purpose of 
furnishing a legal basis for nullifying or reforming contracts. 
 372.  Cherednychenko defines “an unconscionable financial transaction” as “a bargain which is 
(potentially) excessively disadvantageous for the weaker party whose freedom to form an independent 
judgement about the merits of the contract at the time the contract was made has been impaired because 
of what the stronger party has done or omitted to do.” Cherednychenko, supra note 349, at 248. 
 373.  Pacta Sunt Servanda, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); Barral-
Viñais, supra note 369, at 47. 
 374.  See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13, supra note 76, arts. 1–3. 
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term’s unfairness is whether the parties were acting in good faith.375 The 
Directive Preamble provides: 
whereas in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be 
had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the 
consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods 
and services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; 
whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or 
supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose 
legitimate interests he has to take into account.376 
Based upon the foregoing, the ECJ articulated a good faith test in Aziz. 
The test is applicable to the terms of the mortgage contract and probes 
whether “the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the 
consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to 
the term concerned in individual contract negotiations.”377 
In connection with the good faith test, I have three points. First, given 
the goals of obtaining uniformity, stability, and broad participation in 
housing markets across jurisdictions, it is necessary to contemplate rules of 
participation and to adopt a legal framework that helps facilitate those goals. 
One may count good faith and fairness amongst those rules. Second, while 
it is difficult to properly structure an intervening mechanism to judicially 
review disputed contracts, as the Aziz good faith test illustrates, the test is 
aimed at clarifying rather than diluting an already sufficiently developed 
term. Whereas an unrestrained private contract environment might define 
terms identified in the annex to the UCT Directive as within the bounds of 
good faith, the Directive makes clear that they are not. The annex terms and 
scenarios are influenced by notions of fairness deriving in part from human 
rights principles. Third, tests like the one articulated in Aziz are intended to 
provide a framework for evaluating whether good faith and fairness (i.e., 
consideration of the circumstances of the less economically powerful party) 
are reflected in the agreement. While initial attempts to apply the standard 
may be awkward, courts should become more adept at application with each 
case. One can read the Aziz test as the ECJ’s effort to provide detail to help 
guide the evaluative moment. The test signals to lenders (and other suppliers) 
that in order to survive judicial scrutiny they must at least take into account 
the party they are entering into a relationship with, and not structure the deal 
in a way that essentially ensures that the consumer-borrower will fail in 
meeting his contractual obligations. In the future, it will be interesting to 
 
 375.  See id. 
 376.  Id., pmbl., at 1. 
 377.  Case C-415/11, Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62011CJ0415 ¶ 69 (Mar. 
14, 2013). 
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examine to what extent the test helps to curtail predatory lending.378 Ideally, 
the test reflects back on lenders, in the substance of the contracts they 
prepare, and on governments in terms of the civil procedures they have in 
place for the adjudication of contract disputes. 
3. The ECJ’s Good Faith Test in Operation 
Now, taking a closer look at how the ECJ’s good faith test may be 
applied, the following discussion highlights some issues. The ECJ structures 
the test by weighting both the seller and the consumer positions. The seller 
must be fair and even-handed. The consumer must be a reasonable actor in 
determining whether to enter into the contract or agree to the terms under 
scrutiny. One wrinkle in this proposed mechanism is that it is difficult to 
imagine that if borrowers understood the full import of the unfavorable terms 
in their loan contracts, they would agree to them, unless they were desperate. 
If they were desperate, it raises the question of whether they should have 
been permitted to enter into the contract in the first place because 
desperation, arguably, may be construed as a sign of duress. 
While the test is potentially beneficial to mortgage consumers, it is not 
easily administered. Applying the test requires the court to conjure up an 
imagined space in which both actors in the pre-contract “negotiation” are 
assessed.379 The test is likely to allow for invalidation of terms where the 
lender hid them from borrowers (e.g., presented them in small type or buried 
them in footnotes) or presented them in legalese essentially inscrutable for 
many consumers. However, the test does not remove the lender’s interest 
from the equation. That is, it requires courts to assess the lender’s behavior 
for whether it meets the fair and equitable standard. It then asks courts to 
stand in the shoes of the fair and equitable lender and draw conclusions as to 
the kind of terms a consumer would agree to.380 
 
 378.  While the definition of “predatory loan” has been the subject of much debate, Kathleen Engel 
and Patricia McCoy offer a useful way of thinking about this type of contract as exhibiting certain 
markers. In their words, such contracts are designed “to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to 
borrowers.” Engel & McCoy, supra note 367, at 1260–61. 
 379.  The word “negotiation” is placed in quotes to reflect that the parties in the residential mortgage 
loan contract are often not engaged in the level of bargaining suggested by the use of the term. Typically, 
the lender or mortgage broker presents the contract, and the potential borrower must decide whether to 
sign it. 
 380.  It is necessary to ask, “What would inform this assessment?” The court could: examine past 
behavior of consumers; base its determination on empirical studies of consumers regarding the kind of 
basic terms they would accept and the penalties to which they would not want to be subjected; make an 
arbitrary determination of what consumers should not agree to; or balance between a “reasonable” amount 
of profit a lender should be able to make on a residential mortgage loan transaction, as compared to the 
hardship the borrower would suffer if the contract is enforced without modification. 
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4. Resulting Norms and Standards 
Despite the difficulties, deploying a test to assess the absence of good 
faith as a sign of unconscionability is an imperfect but useful approach to 
producing housing contracts that are more equitable and reflective of human 
rights values. Aziz demonstrates the challenge of devising a workable test. It 
also suggests that more is needed so that substantive fairness in private 
housing contracts and the public’s indispensable interest in housing can be 
achieved. Private law actors contribute to the process of devising norms and 
standards. The difference, under the new paradigm, is that the actions of the 
dominant participant are subject to considerations of the weaker party. 
Private law precepts alone, such as freedom of contract, fail to protect weaker 
parties.381 
The “more” requires drawing upon human rights principles. Human 
rights ideals regarding dignity and the significance of the home (rented or 
owned) to one’s psychological and overall well-being are substantive content 
that can help fill up the concept of unconscionability when courts are 
prevailed upon to evaluate housing contracts.382 Human dignity speaks more 
broadly to the constitution of the individual who is to be accorded respect, a 
basic level of treatment, and privacy, merely because of the individual’s 
status as a human being. The focus on dignity requires a reorientation 
towards the transaction. Normatively, dignity extends to individuals certain 
protections in their person and in how they live. It places obligations and 
restrictions on the state and others. Although dignity itself requires further 
definition,383 including dignity as a principle changes the frame to be used 
for the evaluation of whether a contract is so unduly weighted in favor of one 
party that it must be deemed unconscionable. 
With respect to the arguments of public law scholars, the shift towards 
more equitable contracts, even though characterized by an emphasis on 
procedural fairness at the supranational level, is noteworthy. Their concern, 
which I share, is that procedural equality will function as a protective shield 
 
 381.  I share Joseph Singer’s conclusion: 
The American ideals of equality and liberty require laws that regulate market transactions to 
ensure that we are free from unfair practices and that our economic system is not periodically 
threatened by the negligent creation of toxic assets. Such regulations do not take away our 
liberty; they promote liberty. Such regulations do not treat us unequally by giving special 
protection to the weak; they ensure that we enter the marketplace on equal terms and that we 
can expect the same treatment that others would want for themselves and their family members. 
Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV. CR.-C.L. 
L. REV. 141, 167 (2012). 
 382.  Human dignity is a foundational concept for international human rights. The first chapter of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights is titled “Dignity.” EU Charter, supra note 81, art. 1. 
 383.  See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 655 (2008). 
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for businesses and governments, representing an acceptable limit on what is 
required of businesses and government in their interactions with individuals. 
The degree to which new laws and rules on housing transactions translate 
into meaningful change will depend on several factors. It is necessary to 
monitor whether individuals attain substantial relief from oppressive 
contractual situations. National courts must adhere to the mandate to remove 
unfair terms from residential mortgage and rental contracts. Lenders and 
landlords must be incentivized to write transactional documents in ways that 
meet the requisites of good faith and conscionability. Lastly, governments 
must protect their constituents and satisfy their fundamental need for 
housing. 
VII. PROGRESS FOR HOUSING CONSUMERS 
 Deep reflections on the meaning of fairness and substantive equality are 
blossoming in human rights sectors384 and juridical dialogue.385 Shifts in the 
framing of housing are occurring at the municipal, national, and international 
levels. While enshrining the right to housing is a fundamental step, other 
legal mechanisms are required for the right to be realized. More specifically, 
protecting individuals in relation to their housing interests requires an 
approach that contemplates both human rights values and private law 
concepts. According to one study, approximately “ten percent of the total 
population, and twenty-three percent of the households at risk of poverty 
(with an income below sixty percent of the median), in the European Union 
struggle with rent arrears or mortgage payments.”386 The centrality of 
housing to the human experience weighs in favor of investing the concepts 
of good faith and unconscionability with the human rights principles of 
dignity, compassion, and vulnerability.387 The failure to include a broader, 
 
 384.  The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights issued an opinion paper advocating a 
broad interpretation of the right to housing. See Council of Europe, Comm’r for Human Rts. [CoE], 
Housing Rights: The Duty to Ensure Housing for All, at 1, U.N. Doc. CommDH/IssuePaper(2008)1 (Apr. 
25, 2008). 
 385.  Courts can coordinate the mixing of concepts from the two regimes when neither offers a 
sufficient answer. If reasonableness is usually determined according to industry standards, an application 
of that norm will likely result in more wins for the seller and less protection for the consumer. In contrast, 
if what is reasonable is viewed from the standpoint of the consumer, then the court must devote more 
attention to the consumer’s knowledge and positionality. 
 386.  Anna Kahlmeter et al., Housing Evictions and Economic Hardship: A Prospective Study, 34 
EUR. SOC. REV. 106, 106 (2018). 
 387.  Sweden offers an approach permitting the state to intervene heavily in affairs of private law 
with socio-economic policies subsidizing housing. Empiricists Anna Kahlmeter, Olof Bäckman, and Lars 
Bränström conclude that, “while many European countries were hit hard by the [2007-2010 economic] 
crises, the consequences in Sweden . . . were comparatively moderate, and there was in fact no increase 
in the number of executed evictions in the aftermath of the crises.” Id. As an EU Member, Sweden is 
subject to the UCT Directive. See Case C-468/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Sweden, 
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human-rights informed concept of unconscionability into the calculus 
operates to extend the precariat class of home owners and renters, leaving 
them in a vulnerable position.388 Furthermore, focusing only on reforming 
mortgage instruments fails to adequately attend to the needs of property users 
who are not owners in a traditional sense, like those in need of subsidized or 
low-income rental housing.389 
Scrutinizing the subject matter of new legislation issued by Spain’s 
government and by EU institutions at the supranational level is one way to 
detect whether a cross-pollination of the efficiency incentives of private 
markets and public redistribution goals is occurring. In the aftermath of the 
2008 economic crisis, the Spanish government responded to local and 
international political pressure by crafting several measures revising 
procedures related to mortgage contracts and protections for debtors, along 
with paths for eliminating their debt.390 Spain’s mortgage law, which came 
into effect on March 16, 2019,391 is a recent example. The law addresses the 
interest rate floor clause that the ECJ tackled in Naranjo and adds other 
protections for consumers such as building in time for review of the 
mortgage contract, requiring a notary to participate in contract review prior 
to signing, and restrictions on when banks may foreclose and evict.392 At the 
transnational level, the Mortgage Credit Directive, 2014/17/EU, which, inter 
alia, imposes disclosure and underwriting requirements on lenders, is an 
important addition to the consumer protection arsenal.393 
 
2002 E.C.R. I-04147 (May 7, 2002) (challenging whether Sweden satisfied the requirements of the UCT 
Directive by not making the non-exhaustive list of terms appended to the UCT Directive available to the 
public, and holding that Sweden was not in violation of the Directive on this point). 
 388.  See Margaret Radin’s caution against approaching the world solely in terms of commodification 
and failing to appreciate human relationships and concerns. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Acting in the latter manner, begs the question: what is property for? Id. 
 389.  Some scholars, such as David Super, have proposed expanding notions of property to 
encapsulate the interests of those who are usually viewed as non-owners. See David A. Super, A New 
New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2013). 
 390.  Spain adopted several transitional laws under the encompassing Law 1/2013. These laws were 
challenged on a piecemeal basis in separate requests to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. See, e.g., Case 
C-8/14, BBVA SA v Peñalva López, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX WL 62014CC0008 (Oct. 29, 2015) 
(responding to a request for a preliminary ruling on the Fourth Transitional Law of 1/2013 setting a time 
period for challenging mortgage enforcement proceedings, and holding that the law was in violation of 
the UCT Directive). 
 391.  Ley 5/2019, de 16 de Marzo, reguladora de los contratos de crédito inmobiliario (B.O.E. 2019, 
3814) (Spain). 
 392.  Some of the mortgage law changes were prompted by the EU Mortgage Credit Directive. 
Council Directive 2014/17/EU, supra note 87, para. 34. 
 393.  Id.; Mortgage Credit, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/ 
banking-and-finance/consumer-finance-and-payments/retail-financial-services/credit/mortgage-
credit_en (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) (“The [Mortgage Credit Directive] applies to all loans made to 
consumers for the purpose of buying residential property.”). 
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Spain also revisited domestic practices that contributed to the housing 
insecurity of renters. As a result, Spain’s government issued a series of 
decrees impacting Spain’s Tenancy Act394 and portions of the Civil Code 
pertaining to rental agreements. These new laws target the primary concerns 
of renters such as longer rental terms, limiting the rental renewal rate by 
pegging it to the Consumer Price Index, and a requirement to notify the 
appropriate government entities in conjunction with evictions.395 Barcelona, 
one of Spain’s major cities, has begun levying extraordinary fines on 
landlords who permit their buildings to remain vacant for extensive periods 
of time while the city is suffering from a shortage of social housing.396 The 
city has also been repurposing vacant houses to fulfill social housing 
needs.397 Spain has adopted policies intended to address homelessness such 
as the State Housing Plan (2018–2021)398 and the Comprehensive National 
Homelessness Strategy (2015-2020).399 The back and forth involving the 
issuance of decrees, congressional ratification or repeal,400 and court 
challenges at the local and supranational levels, regarding whether the laws 
conform to human rights obligations and EU directives, are all testaments to 
the iterative nature of the process leading to the emergence of the new public-
private law paradigm. Although Spain’s steps are inchoate and 
insufficient,401 they are nonetheless illustrative of the government acting to 
 
 394.  In Spanish, the Tenancy Act is known as Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos (LAU). Ley de 
Arrendamientos Urbanos (B.O.E. 1994, 282), amended by (B.O.E. 2019) (Spain). 
 395.  José Luis Aranda & José Marcos, Spain Introduces New Rental Rules with More Safeguards 
for Tenants, EL PAÍS (Mar. 6, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/04/ 
inenglish/1551692513_394392.html. 
 396.  Notably, Ada Colau, a former PAH activist, is the mayor imposing the Barcelona fines. The 
monetary penalties are meant to punish and incentivize the investment companies who have opted to hold 
their properties vacant until the housing market improves or direct them towards more lucrative uses. See 
Feargus O’Sullivan, In Need of Housing, Barcelona Fines Landlords for Long-Vacant Buildings, 
BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Mar. 15, 2019, 10:20 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/barcelona-
affordable-housing-spain-apartment-rental-fines/584902/. 
 397.  Id. 
 398.  See ANA ARRIBA & GREGORIO RODRÍGUEZ CABRERO, HOUSING PLAN IN SPAIN FOR 2018-
2021: ESPN FLASH REPORT 2018/58 (2018) (giving overview of the plan). 
 399.  See GREGORIO RODRÍGUEZ CABRERO & VICENTE MARBÁN GALLEGO, SPAIN’S FIRST 
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL HOMELESSNESS STRATEGY: ESPN FLASH REPORT 2016/25 (2016) (stating 
the Spanish Government adopted the Comprehensive National Homelessness Strategy 2015–2020 on 
November 6, 2015). 
 400.  Royal decrees are subject to approval by Congress. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 
311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 401.  While Spain has taken encouraging steps in the direction of protecting renters, there are glaring 
omissions. High rental rates continue to cripple the overall well-being of the country. Contributors to the 
high rent include speculation, Airbnb rentals, and the lack of a sufficient supply of low-income and social 
housing. Even though rent levels are spiraling out of the affordability range for the average rental housing 
consumer, the government has struggled to adequately address this issue. Ana Garcia Valdivia, Rising 
Rents in Spain Threaten Low-Income Households, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:43 AM),  
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devise regulations to render private law contracts more conscious of public 
values and interests. 
While there has been progress in the mortgage law area from the 
standpoint of consumer protections,402 space remains for expanding the 
protective net. One positive change is the voluntary pledge of some lending 
institutions to abide by the “European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of 
Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information for Home Loans.”403 This measure 
is aimed at rebalancing the existing asymmetries in information between 
banks and borrowers. Notwithstanding promising aspects of the code, 
because it is voluntary, it does not provide oversight or enforcement, and 
does not offer comprehensive protections for all stages of the financing 
contract; it is insufficient to achieve uniform extensive protection for 
“weaker” contractual parties. For the most part, Spanish banks have 
interposed roadblocks to progress. For example, they have largely been 
resistant to a remedy for mortgage borrowers that would allow them to 
emerge from debt following a default.404 The procedure, known as datio in 
solutum (dación en pago), essentially equates to a deed in lieu of foreclosure 
in the United States. In accordance with the procedure, the foreclosing bank 
accepts the deed and property in exchange for releasing the borrower from 
his debt obligation. The historical resistance of Spanish banks to accepting 
the collateral property in full satisfaction of the debt is indicative of the clash 
between socio-cultural conceptions of the home and conceptions emanating 
from the private sector and, sometimes, government. Individual homeowners 
and renters focus on aspects of housing related to dignity: the home is a place 
to live, raise their families, and accumulate wealth to ensure their financial 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anagarciavaldivia/2019/08/08/historic-highs-in-the-rental-market-in-
spain-threaten-low-income-households/#730627d21c0c; Todd White, Spain is Latest Battleground for 
Global Affordable Housing, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2019-06-19/spain-is-latest-battleground-in-global-affordable -housing-fight. 
 402.  For example, the bank can no longer acquire the foreclosed property for 50% of its appraised 
value at the time of the loan. In July 2011, the percentage amount was increased to 60% and has since 
then been raised to 70 percent. The EU has made additional interventions in this area. Since Aziz, the EU 
adopted a Directive on February 4, 2014 on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property. 
The fact that the EU is being proactive suggests that it recognizes the need to address in a uniform fashion 
the inequities that consumers experience in mortgage loan contracts. Council Directive 2014/17/EU, 
supra note 87, para. 34. 
 403.  See European Banking Federation et al., European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct 
on Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans: First Annual Progress Report on Implementation in the 
European Union by 30th September 2002, at 3 (2002) (reporting “over 3600 credit institutions” in Europe 
had registered with the Commission’s register). 
 404.  Blanket resistance to deed in lieu deals has been shifting post-recession, as some banks have 
agreed to this procedure. See Art Patnaude & David Román, Fall in Spain’s House Prices Steepens, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012. 6:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323981504 
578179270357838436. 
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well-being; banks rely upon housing as a profitmaking vehicle that structures 
the lives of individuals without, at times, fully communicating associated 
risks to borrowers. 
VIII. PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDING HOUSING RIGHTS 
The Great Recession teaches that homeownership, without more, 
should not be the sole focal point of government development strategies. 
Building affordable housing should be a critical element of governmental 
policy. Governments should reallocate funds to enlarge the inventory of 
public housing.405 Affordability should be measured in relationship to 
income so that those falling within poverty and low-income categories are 
able to secure housing. Spain should establish an affordable housing 
network, a system by which individuals with housing needs are directed to 
available apartments. Moreover, government should develop affordable 
housing in urban centers and other places that are within close proximity to 
employment opportunities, essential social resources, and infrastructure. 
Having a sufficient supply of reasonably priced and government-funded 
housing to accommodate the population is essential in economies where 
there are low wages and high unemployment. Governments should design 
programs to repurpose existing housing for rental purposes.406 Programs of 
this type would work particularly well in economies in which the market is 
saturated with vacant homes for purchase,407 and when the vacant housing is 
centrally-located. In keeping with the mandates of the international human 
right to housing, social policies should be formulated to subsidize individuals 
for housing costs. Spain should also enlist the help of banks to create 
alternative housing arrangements for foreclosed borrowers. However, 
caution is necessary so that the alternatives do not ultimately prove to be 
detrimental to housing consumers.408 
 
 405.  Local government entities should be cautious about not giving too many incentives to 
developers at the expense of the goal of serving the public interest. 
 406.  This is one of the proposals advanced by Spain’s activists. SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 6, 
52. 
 407.  See Abbey-Lambertz, supra note 45 (noting that there were three million unoccupied homes in 
Spain in 2014); Guillem Fernandez Evangelista, Shrinking Social Housing Stocks as a Barrier to the 
Eradication of Homelessness: The Cases of Germany, Finland, the United Kingdom and Spain, 10 EUR. 
J. HOMELESSNESS 151, 167 (2016) (noting that a lack of resources limits even relatively comprehensive 
housing programs); Edwards, supra note 43 (discussing efforts in Spain to use vacant homes to house 
homeless citizens); see Keith, supra note 45 (discussing how only twenty percent of residential 
apartments were sold in a complex with 13,500 units in the town of El Quiñón). 
 408.  For example, rent-to-own contracts should not be structured in a predatory way which allows 
banks to further harm defaulted borrowers who were subjected to the foreclosure process. Further, one of 
history’s lessons is that, with rental rate freezes, Spain must monitor landlords so that they maintain their 
buildings to meet habitable standards. Otherwise, it could result in a repeat of what happened when there 
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Finally, Spain needs to further cultivate laws in the area of discharging 
debts so that individuals will be able to fully re-engage in the socio-economy. 
The human rights “fresh start” campaign is an affirmative step in this 
direction.409 Housing counselors should be available to explain the meaning 
of contract terms pertaining to housing; however, a counseling requirement 
should never be allowed to substitute for fairness and good faith. In the realm 
of mortgage lending, underwriting standards need to be strengthened. The 
Bank of Spain, as the national oversight body, should perform its regulatory 
role not only with an eye towards EU compliance, but with an appreciation 
of the purpose of the consumer-oriented protections.410 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The early twenty-first century judicial and legislative reforms that have 
played out on the canvas of Spain have international origins and significance. 
Moreover, they can be construed in several ways. They signal a conceptual 
change, an emergence of a protective regime focused on individuals, 
families, and consumers. The global economic crisis brought attention to the 
profound relationship between the rental housing market and lending 
practices in the homeownership market. Governments and banks have the 
power to influence economic wealth by manipulating housing markets.411 In 
Spain, and other countries, the combination of easily accessible purchase 
financing along with high demand and the insufficient supply of quality 
affordable rental housing in the years preceding the Great Recession set the 
conditions for economic exploitation. The case of Spain illustrates that 
regulation of housing markets is necessary to even the playing field between 
private actors, the populace, and their governments. Like any sovereign 
nation, Spain is empowered to rethink its approach to markets without 
prompting from the international community. The analysis herein, however, 
chronicles a different path. It highlights Spain in dialogue with supranational 
organs, private actors, and public activists in reimagining private law 
contracts. The multi-dimensional reframing of housing is aimed at both 
reallocating resources and power and achieving fairness in housing 
transactions. While Spain is only one data point, the role of international 
institutions in regulating housing markets supports the conclusion that the 
 
was a rental freeze in the 1940s, which resulted in a proliferation of dilapidated uninhabitable housing. 
See Cardesín, supra note 10, at 290. 
 409.  See SUNDERLAND, supra note 14, at 68–69. 
 410.  Spanish banks are subject to EU directives. See Fernando Mínguez & Miguel Sánchez Monjo, 
Banking Regulation in Spain, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=b027178c-17ea-4b1f-9e76-1066e2d97f49. 
 411.  See MBD, supra note 57, paras. 5.5, 12.4 (chiding Spain for feeding housing speculation rather 
than addressing the needs of its populace). 
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lessons are not confined to one country. Housing market rules are not 
preordained. When markets fail to serve broad social goals, it is imperative 
to rethink how they are structured and the relevant rules by which they 
should abide. Shifts and reorientations can and should occur to address basic 
human needs. With the appropriate rules, markets should be able to operate 
without political disruptions that are inspired by intolerable conditions, such 
as summary evictions, homelessness, and extreme socio-economic 
inequality.412 
This Article demonstrates the importance of public law to private law. 
It illustrates how the various sectors of protest, private law, and public law 
can intermingle, dynamically, to create change. Public activism informs both 
private law and human rights actors about the needs and concerns of people. 
Public protest exposes the neglect and detrimental actions of the government 
and private entities. It amasses the evidence. It lays bare the pain inflicted. 
Protest furnishes an agenda.413 Private law sets the parameters of the 
agreements between lenders, borrowers, and guarantors, and between 
landlords and tenants. It provides substance that informs the contractual 
terms established. The rules of interaction are carved out. Courts may 
interpret the terms and through international legal instruments, such as the 
UCT Directive, evaluate whether they meet a minimum standard of fairness 
and good faith. Human rights discourse focuses on the need to secure 
resources and protections necessary to enhance the quality of life. 
International human rights law, as exemplified by the ICESCR, has a stake 
in rewriting mortgage and rental laws and, more broadly, in shaping housing 
reforms. Human rights are not suspended merely because the matter 
originates from private ordering arrangements.414 Whether human rights 
principles are adhered to expressly in name, or whether they are adhered to 
in spirit, the essential point is that courts, governing structures, and 
businesses are cognizant of them and are compelled to act in accordance with 
them, even if doing so is costly in the short-term. 
 
 412.  As property scholar Joseph Singer posits: “Political theory supports the idea of creating a 
democracy that respects fundamental human rights. This institutional setting forms the background within 
which the market can operate, not the reverse.” Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property 
Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2009); see also Suzanne Daley, 
Foreclosure Protestors in Spain’s Cities Now Go Door to Door, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/europe/16spain.html (discussing Spanish protests of 
foreclosures and government corruption); Daley, supra note 24 (examining the severity of personal 
liability mortgages in Spain and their impact on individuals). 
 413.  Through protest, PAH incentivized individuals to initiate claims against the states and against 
financial institutions. 
 414.  MBD, supra note 57. 
